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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this paper is on improving the U.S. Navy’s execution of technical 
authority.   
1. Technical authority targets compliance with technical criteria and 
standards.  
2. This targeting must be done at the earliest stages of program development 
and addressed during development of the program acquisition strategy.  
3. An executable acquisition strategy must take into consideration the Navy’s 
technical authority responsibility.   
4. A successful strategy needs to provide the industry sufficient time to fully 
develop plans and deliver products, especially in high-risk program areas, 
and incorporate a system engineering process where the technical 
authorities can perform their mission.   
5. History has shown that costs will increase if technical risks are not 
adequately addressed. 
The purpose of this focus — on improving execution of technical authority — is 
to reduce exposure to risks and costs.  This thesis defines the relationship between 
program authority and technical authority, and improves the state of technical authority 
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In 2006, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 
Acquisition, ASN (RD&A), mandated the transformation of Naval Sea Systems 
Command (NAVSEA) into a competency-aligned organization (CAO).  A CAO fosters a 
competency-based approach to mission performance.  A key objective of NAVSEA’s 
new CAO is to improve program management authority and contract authority through 
more effective technical authority.  A key challenge facing NAVSEA in establishing a 
new CAO, is aligning program management, contract, and technical competencies.  This 
will require a common alignment of the engineering workforce across the Navy, as well 
as common policy development and implementation.  
NAVSEA is establishing the Research & Systems Engineering (R&SE) 
Competency.  The R&SE Competency is one of nine competencies in the NAVSEA 
CAO.  The R&SE Competency will focus on leading the workforce, managing the 
workload, and delivering combat systems and hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) 
products to U.S. Navy Fleet customers through integrated product teams (IPTs) using 
common processes, engineering support and certification, and five vector employee 
development models.  
The Navy Systems Commands (SYSCOMs) are assessing and improving the state 
of technical authority through common policy development and implementation, 
competency alignment, and targeted funding.  Common Systems Engineering and 
Technical Authority (SE/TA) policy development and implementation continue to show 
steady progress.  Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) and Naval Supply Command 
(NAVSUP) have now adopted the TA policy instruction the Naval Aviation Systems 
Command (NAVAIR), NAVSEA, and the Space Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR) established in January 2005.  Common approaches and frameworks for 
implementing TA through system engineering (SE) processes are provided in the Naval 
Systems Engineering Guide, published in 2004.  What the SYSCOMs need now is a 
common risk-management process, a common policy for developing Systems 
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Engineering Plans (SEAs), a common technical review process, a common total platform 
and interoperability certification process, and a common systems engineering training 
program. 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis seeks to improve the U.S. Navy’s execution of technical authority.  It 
provides a common risk management and technical assessment process, defines 
data/information elements needed to assess and track risks, and gives an overview of risk 
management within the context of overall program execution.  This thesis also illustrates 
a top-level view of the relationship risk management has with program management and 
systems engineering at a macro level, and thereby identifies and describes the 
interdependencies and information flow necessary to manage risks.   
1. Risk Management in DoD Background  
The Department of Defense (DoD) requires program managers and acquisition 
officials to continually evaluate program risks and assess those risks in a manner 
appropriate to the system being acquired.  The risk management discipline has been 
mandated via the DoD 5000 series guidance that evolved through thorough study, review, 
and analysis of acquisition successes and failures [1].  Extensive studies of commercial 
and government best practices form the foundation for the DoD 5000 series [2].  In 
addition to the imperatives delineated in that top-level guidance, risk management is 
further emphasized in the DoD Acquisition Guidebook and is a key curriculum 
component for the Defense Acquisition University. 
B. DEFINITIONS AND A COMMON RISK LEXICON 
Arguably, the most important attribute of a common risk management and 
technical assessment process is a commonly used set of terms.  The most common terms 
pertaining to risk management are presented in this chapter.  Other terms that may be 
useful are defined in Appendix A. 
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1. Risk 
Risk is a measure of the inability to achieve overall objectives within defined cost, 
schedule, and technical performance constraints [6].  It has two components: (1) the 
likelihood of failing to achieve a desired result and (2) the consequences of failing to 
achieve that result [6].  For processes, risk is a measure of the difference between the 
actual performance of a process and the known best practice for performing that process. 
2. Risk Management 
Risk management is the act or practice of dealing with uncertainty [6].  It includes 
planning for risk, assessing (identifying and analyzing) risk areas, developing risk-
handling options, monitoring risks to determine how risks have changed, and 
documenting the overall risk management program [6].  Figure 1 provides an overview of 
risk management components. 
 
Risk Management Overview
Risk AssessmentRisk Planning Risk Handling Risk Monitoring
Risk AnalysisRisk Identification
Risk Documentation  
Figure 1.   Overview of Risk Management Components, from [6]. 
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Successful risk management depends upon appropriate tailoring of these risk 
management components to satisfy all relevant requirements beginning with the most 
critical ones.  This requires focused management attention.  In order to focus 
management attention on areas of uncertainty, which pose threats to program success, 
risk management must: 
 Define, assess, and monitor metrics used to indicate program health 
 Assess and characterize risks from the government’s perspective 
o Set prioritizes based upon criticality of system and acquisition requirements 
o Establish (adjust) risk tolerance/risk acceptance levels to optimize return   
on investment 
 Provide the organization with tools, training, and support so that risk 
management concepts and processes are routinely practiced and understood 
by all program participants.  
Successful risk management is highly dependent upon the degree of interaction 
between the program management, risk management, and system engineering disciplines.   
Success is also dependent upon standardization and consistent application of risk 
assessment criteria that are traceable to overall program objectives. 
DoD acquisition reform initiatives have empowered industry at the earliest 
possible stage of design development to achieve design capabilities and substantially 
lower total ownership cost.  Therefore, DoD risk management must leverage industry risk 
management by: 
 Establishing a program risk management process that includes (leverages) industry 
risk management 
 Identifying Critical Program Attributes (CPAs) 
 Defining risk assessment criteria that link to CPAs 
 Provide tools, training, and risk planning 
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3. Technical Risk 
Technical risks are those tied to design and production of the systems necessary to 
meet user requirements [6].  The contractors’ and subcontractors’ design, test, and 
production processes influence the technical risk [6].  The nature of the desired product 
or system is depicted in the various levels of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)  
4. Cost Risk 
Cost risks are uncertainties related to achieving total life cycle cost objectives [6].  
Cost risk analysis, in general, examines: (1) the risk that cost estimates and objectives are 
not accurate and reasonable, and (2) the risk that program execution will not meet the 
cost objectives as a result of a failure to mitigate operational or development risks [6]. 
5. Schedule Risk 
Schedule risks address the uncertainties linked to the adequacy of the time 
estimated and allocated for development, production, and fielding of the system [6].  
Schedule risk is usually analyzed in terms of:  (1) the risk that schedule estimates and 
objectives are not realistic and reasonable, and (2) the risk that program execution will 
fall short of schedule objectives as a result of failure to mitigate operational or 
development risks [6]. 
6. Risk Ratings 
Risk ratings are calculated values based on the analysis of the likelihood and 
consequences of failure [6].  Qualitative risk ratings of low, moderate, or high can be 
assigned based on the following descriptive criteria.   
• Low Risk:  Has little potential to cause schedule disruption, increase cost, or 
degrade performance [6].  Normal contractor effort and normal government 
monitoring will probably be able to overcome uncertainties. 
• Moderate Risk:  Can potentially cause some disruption of schedule, increase 
in cost, or increase degradation of performance [6].  Special contractor 
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emphasis and close government monitoring will probably be able to overcome 
uncertainties.  A moderate risk level indicates that the program manager’s 
control may be needed to avoid significant impact to the program. 
• High Risk:  Likely to cause serious disruption of schedule, increase in cost, or 
increase degradation of performance even with special contractor emphasis and 
close government monitoring [6].  A high-risk level indicates the need for the 
program manager’s control to avoid serious impact to the program. 
7. Independent Risk Assessor 
An independent risk assessor is an individual or committee that is not in the 
management chain or assigned to perform the tasks being assessed [6].  Use of 
independent risk assessors is a technique used to ensure that all risk areas are identified 
and that consequence and likelihood (or process variance) of not meeting operational 
performance requirements or development requirements are properly understood [6].  
The technique can be used at different program levels (e.g., Program Office, Service 
Field Activities, and Contractors) [6].  The program manager will approve the use of 
independent assessors [6].  In general, risk managers, department heads, and functional 
area experts will recommend independent assessments as circumstances dictate. 
8. Templates and Best Practices 
A template is a disciplined approach for the application of critical engineering and 
manufacturing processes that are essential to the success of most programs [6].  DoD 
4245.7-M, Transition from Development to Production, Solving the Risk Equation, 
provides several examples of these templates [6].  For each template process described in 
DoD 4245.7-M, a corresponding best practice is described in NAVSO P-6071 [6].  These 
documents outline the ideal or low risk approach and thus serve as a baseline to assess 
risk for some processes [6].  It should be noted that the best practices are continuously 
evolving.  The DoD has instituted a variety of acquisition reform initiatives to keep pace 
with evolving business trends and to take advantage of successful methods.  In that 
 7
regard, a common risk management and technical assessment process must maintain 
currency to the degree possible in order to provide program participants with an 
understanding of emerging best practices that can be used as benchmarks to assess 
program processes and procedures. 
9. Metrics 
Metrics are measures used to indicate progress or achievement.  Risk metrics fall 
into two principal categories: (1) risk management metrics, which are used to indicate 
risk management progress; and (2) metrics used to indicate program health.  Defining, 
monitoring, and assessing these metrics is critical to the overall risk assessment process.  
Executing these functions facilitates establishing linkages between designs and 
requirements. 
Examples of both metrics categories are found in Appendix B.  Further discussion 
of metrics and their use in risk analysis is contained in Chapter II, Section B. 
10. Critical Program Attributes 
Critical Program Attributes (CPA) are performance, cost, and schedule metrics 
that are vital to program success [6].  They are derived from various sources, such as the 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB), exit criteria for the next program phase, Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs), test plans, judgment of program experts, and other 
sources.  These attributes are tracked to determine the progress in achieving the final 
required value.   
11. Reference 
Metrics may be qualitative or quantitative and are referenced to either operational 
performance or a development requirement.  Ultimately, all operational performance and 
development requirements are related to program objectives or to a process best practice. 
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12. Technical Assessment Process (TAP) 
Implementing a common risk management and technical assessment process 
requires a Technical Assessment Process (TAP) instruction to assess progress in 
achieving program objectives.  (See Chapter II, Sections C and E for more details.)  The 
TAP provides an assessment hierarchy, a structure akin to a WBS, tailored for the 
program.  The TAP hierarchy establishes the organizational structure for documenting 
and reporting assessment results including risks.  In analyzing risk, the TAP hierarchical 
structure is used to ensure risk assessment is directly linked to technical assessment.  An 
Integrated Assessment Tool (IAT) is essential to assist in this process.  An IAT serves to 
link technical assessment data with cost and schedule data, further supporting a 
consolidated assessment process and reporting procedures.  Key features of an IAT are 
presented in the following paragraphs. 
13. Integrated Assessment Tool (IAT) 
An IAT is a risk management communication tool.  It defines the risk program 
data/information needs required to support program management.  An IAT captures the 
normalized assessment results of the technical, cost and schedule assessments, including 
the particular references/scenarios/metrics used to conduct each individual assessment.  
Included in an IAT are risk identification, analysis, mitigation, and tracking fields used to 
manage program risks.  Data/information fields include: 
• Scenario—Operational Situation (OPSIT) definition or Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) definition.  Different scenarios may dictate different risk 
indicators.  
• Metric Utility—Indicates the significance of the metric.  Metrics that indicate 
failure to achieve either desired or required performance would have moderate 
or high metric utility.  Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) represent the 
program’s vital metrics and, therefore, have high metric utility.  Metric utility 
may be used to highlight the significance of a particular high or moderate risk 
and/or its mitigation plan.   
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• Normalized Estimate—The estimated assessment as to the design’s ability to 
meet performance or operational thresholds.  Functional area experts who 
assign technical assessment metrics will determine this value.  Estimates are 
normalized to a scale from –1 to +2, where 0 indicates the threshold level and 
+1 indicates the objective. 
• Estimate Uncertainty—Lower and upper confidence levels applied to the 
normalized estimate that indicate the degree of uncertainty in the normalized 
estimate.  It is based upon best engineering judgment, testing, modeling and 
simulation, past experience, and other factors. 
• Risk Description—A concise statement summarizing risk analysis results 
links failure probability to the consequence of failure to achieve desired or 
required performance. 
• Analysis Source—Primary data source supporting the risk assessment (e.g., 
best engineering judgment, modeling and simulation, test results, engineering 
report, etc.) 
• Cost Exposure—Cost adjustments required to mitigate risk. 
• Schedule Exposure—Schedule adjustments required to mitigate risk. 
• Resource Status—Degree to which resources have been planned and 
programmed to address identified risks. 
• Fallback Options—Description of options included as mitigation measures.  
Options should include cost, schedule, and performance impacts. 
• Post Mitigation Probability of Failure Pf—Estimate of probability of failure to 
meet or threshold requirements after mitigation. 
• Post Mitigation Consequence of Failure Cf—Estimate of consequence of 
failure to meet program objectives after mitigation. 
 10
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II. COMMON RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
A. RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
The risk management strategy is designed to correspond with the acquisition 
strategy.  While risk management execution resides with industry, risk management 
responsibility resides with the government program manager.  The government must 
assess industry risk management programs.  The government must also perform 
independent risk assessments as a part of the TAP.  The risk management strategy: 
• Encourages integration with overall program management and fosters 
excellence in industry’s execution of their own risk management programs 
• Focuses on procuring the best possible system within the constraints levied 
upon the program by adjusting risk tolerance/risk acceptance levels in order to 
optimize return on investment 
• Sets program priorities based upon the criticality of system and acquisition 
requirements 
• Assesses and characterizes industry’s risks from the government’s perspective 
• Assesses and evaluates the industry’s risk management programs and their 
viability (See Appendix C for criteria). 
• Provides the program organization with appropriate tools, training, and 
support so that risk management concepts and processes are routinely 
practiced and understood by program participants 
• Supports the program manager and the System Technical Assessment and 
Review (STAR) Panel in characterizing, assessing, and reporting risks; during 
the overall program risk characterization (See Appendix D for a sample 
format to maintain and present program risks)  
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• Develop independent risk identification, assessment, mitigation, and tracking 
capabilities required to manage government-unique risks (not specifically 
industry risks). 
B. RISK MANAGEMENT — AN OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of risk management within 
the context of program management.  Figure 2 presents a top-level view of the 
relationship risk management has with program management and systems engineering.  
Although clear lines of demarcation between these three disciplines are presented, these 
are highly-interdependent and integrated.  Successful risk management is highly-
dependent upon the degree of integration between these three areas.  Success is also 
dependent on standardization and consistent application of risk assessment criteria that 
are traceable to overall program objectives. 
Figure 2 illustrates, at a macro level, the interdependencies and information flow 
necessary to manage risks.  Program objectives, as illustrated, have been translated into 
requirements by program management using top-level mission definitions.  These 
definitions, included in both the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) and Capabilities 
Development Document (CDD), are translated into system requirements that industry 
designs must satisfy.   
The program manager interprets and transforms the user’s original requirements 
to program participants including industry and the government’s systems engineering and 
risk management teams.  The systems engineering teams perform comprehensive 
technical assessments of proposed industry designs.  Part of this technical assessment, as 
illustrated, is a risk analysis. 
The risk management team contributes to risk analysis by defining risk 
assessment criteria that link to program objectives.  A standardized set of numerical 
values linked to qualitative descriptors comprise these criteria.  Risk analysis considers 
and assigns consequence of failure (Cf) and probability of failure (Pf) criteria selected 
from the standardized numerical values.  Program risks are the primary output of the risk  
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analysis process.  The severity of risks or risk factor (Rf), is determined by the product of 
Cf and Pf.  Moderate and high Risks are monitored, tracked, and reported as indicated by 
Figure 2. 
In addition to providing standardized risk analysis criteria, the risk management 
team provides tools, training, and risk planning. 
The most severe risks are communicated directly with program management 
because of their potential negative impact. 
As indicated in Figure 2, the STAR Panel plays a major role in the risk 
management process.  It receives the outputs of the risk analysis process and performs 
review, adjudication, prioritization, and strategy development.  The STAR Panel reports 
its findings to the program manager. 
Once high and moderate risks have been reported to the program manager, risk 
handling options are evaluated and implemented. 
Risk handling is the process that identifies, evaluates, selects, and implements 
options in order to set risk at acceptable levels given program constraints and objectives 
[6].  In general, options include: 
• Risk Control – Seeks to reduce or mitigate risks instead of eliminating the 
source of the risk  [6] 
• Risk Avoidance – Eliminates sources of unacceptable risk and replaces them 
with a lower risk solution [6] 
• Risk Assumption – Acknowledgement and acceptance of the level of risk for 
a particular risk situation [6] 
• Risk Transfer – Reallocation of risk from one part of a system to another [6] 
 Numerous possible risk control or mitigation actions should be considered.  
Creativity in risk control is encouraged and fostered by the collaborative IPT process.  


















Figure 2.   Top-level view of the relationship between risk management and program 
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1. The Risk Analysis Process 








Figure 3.   Risk Analysis Process. 
2. Risk Identification 
Risk identification is the process of examining system designs and critical 
technical processes to identify and document associated risk.  Each person involved with 
the design, construction/manufacture, operation, support, and disposal of the system 
should be cognizant of associated risks.  The earlier risks are identified, the easier they 
will be to manage and the less negative impact they will have upon program cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives.  A selection of risk identification methods is 
presented in Appendix F.   
The risk management IPT maintains a tool box containing tools that can be used 
in conjunction with risk identification and other risk management processes.  These tools 
are listed and described in Appendix G.  The tool box is not intended to be all-inclusive, 
for the array of specialized and emerging methodologies continues to grow as research 
and lessons learned are applied in both commercial and government program 
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management communities.  This selected list is continuously expanding and program 
participants should use this resource, as required, to enhance individual assessments. 
3. Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment represents the next step in the overall risk management process 
and is intended to provide a priority ranking for all identified risks.  In the risk 
management process, both operational and development functional areas are assessed.   
In conducting risk assessments, evaluators should not routinely conclude that 
risks represent weaknesses or strengths.  As illustrated in Table 1, either case is possible.  
It is important for evaluators to discriminate between the two.  Risks are part of the 
overall program management process and should be used to gain insight into designs, 
CONOPs, and development plans.  Credibility can be supported by properly recognizing 
and categorizing risk. 
In general, a risk is a strength if its resolution represents a significant 
enhancement of existing capabilities and falls within the program’s cost and schedule 
envelope.  A risk can be characterized as a strength if it is identified and adequately 
defined so that its degree of uncertainty and its impact/consequence can be assessed.  It 
must include a reasonable mitigation plan, including fallback options that can be 
executed within the constraints of the program. 
Conversely, a risk that has not been addressed with a reasonable mitigation plan, 
or a mitigation plan that cannot be executed within program constraints, represents a 
weakness.  A risk represents a weakness if it has been ignored or omitted by industry.  
Lesser weaknesses are indicated if the risks are inadequately defined, if the risk 




Table 1.   Risks as Strengths and Weaknesses. 
Risks as Strengths and Weaknesses 
 Strength Weakness 
Undefined Risk Not Applicable Possible 
Unmitigated Risk Not Applicable Possible 
Feasible Mitigation Possible Not Applicable 
Viable Fallback Possible Not Applicable 
 
4. Risk Mitigation 
Once risk has been identified and assessed, Step 3, risk mitigation, is executed.  
As part of this step, the risk owner develops a mitigation plan consisting of specific tasks 
that, when implemented, will reduce the stated risk to an acceptable level.  This does not 
necessarily mean reducing the risk to “low.”  In most cases, “no risk” is a symptom of 
lack of progress in engaging and applying innovative technologies.  This position 
concerning risk tolerance levels allows for some degree of risk acceptance, particularly if 
it leads to future gains in terms of performance, schedule, and/or cost.   
The risk mitigation process requires localizing the source of the identified risk and 
being careful not to confuse symptoms with cause.  It is the source that will receive the 
necessary mitigation resources.  Once the source has been localized, a mitigation plan 
must be developed that describes what has to be done, when, by whom, the level of 
effort, and the material or facilities required to mitigate risk to an acceptable level.  Valid 
risk mitigation strategies should include contingency plans in the event that planned 
mitigation efforts fail.  A proposed schedule for accomplishing these actions is required, 
as well as a cost estimate, if possible.  The “DoD 4245.7-M Templates” and “NAVSO P-
6071 Best Practices” manuals described in Appendix G are two excellent sources for 
assisting program participants in developing solid mitigation plans. 
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5. Risk Tracking 
Risk tracking, Step 4, is based upon the principles of ownership and open 
communication.  The originator is the owner of a reported risk and retains cognizance for 
reporting that risk’s status.  Ownership includes implementing plans for mitigating 
moderate and high-risk areas.   
To ensure risk is adequately tracked, program managers should ensure that risk is 
an agenda item at every appropriate meeting or review.  Openly discussing risk provides 
an opportunity to collaborate on risk reduction.  Communicating risk improves awareness 
and allows early actions to minimize adverse consequences.   
Risk items and mitigation plan status should be reported to the program manager 
and STAR Panel: 
a. Quarterly; 
b. When the status of the risk area has changed significantly (as a minimum 
when the risk changes from high to moderate to low, or vice versa); or 
c. When requested by the program management team.   
When tracking and reporting risk areas, adhere to the following ground rules: 
a. Always provide sufficient information to the level of detail required for 
others to understand all aspects of a particular risk, its mitigation plan, and status. 
b. The cognizant engineer or analyst is responsible for each risk area.  
Ownership is critical to the risk management process and should not be delegated without 
higher level approval. 
c. Changes to the risk description should be limited to corrections or 
clarifications to the original description.  A significant difference in risk description 
should be considered a candidate for reporting a new risk area. 
d. Rationale should be provided whenever the assessed risk changes between 
categories low, moderate, and high.   
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e. Both reordering the risk mitigation tasks or adding additional actions or 
mitigation tasks are considered acceptable without reporting it as a new risk area. 
f. As a general rule, any risk that has been entered into an appropriate 
database, and reported to a higher authority, must be retained.  The close out of each risk 
area will be based on the merit of the status of associated mitigation actions. 
g. Metrics should be identified and maintained to measure progress in 
minimizing unacceptable risk or maintaining desired risk. 
h. Close-out of risk areas is generally the responsibility of the cognizant 
engineer or analyst, but the latest status must include justification. 
6. Continuous Risk Management 
An arrow from Step 4 returning to Step 1 in Figure 3 indicates that risk analysis 
process is a continuous activity.  Thus, the arrow could just as well return to Step 2, 
denoting the change in priority of a risk area, or to Step 3, denoting a need to modify the 
risk mitigation plans. 
C. RISK MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Risk management during program definition and engineering phases is comprised 
of the following: 
• Executive Level Risk Management – Program risks are identified, 
analyzed, tracked, and reported at the most senior levels of the program.  
Risks considered and analyzed are of the most consequential nature, thus 
meriting executive level scrutiny.  Analysis is conducted primarily using 
personnel with vast acquisition and technical experience.  Lessons learned 
and historical perspectives form the basis of the assessment.  Since risks 
often emerge unexpectedly (budget cuts, test failures, slippages), this level 
of risk management is usually conducted on an ad hoc basis and is often 
focused on mitigation. 
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• Program-Wide Risk Management – is comprised of risk analysis, 
assessment, and tracking during functional area meetings.  Risk should be 
a regular agenda item in functional area meetings and reviews. 
• Risk Management and the Technical Assessment Process (TAP) – The 
TAP specifies the process, criteria, and hierarchy to be used as well as the 
Integrated Assessment Tool (IAT) to perform program-wide risk 
management. (See Appendix H for a sample instruction to implement a 
common risk management and technical assessment process.) 
• Risk Management IPT – This team is responsible for maintaining a 
current risk profile for the program.  They are also responsible for 
providing program participants with appropriate tools, processes, and 
guidance to interactively and collaboratively manage risk.   
1. Roles and Responsibilities 
Risk management success is contingent upon it being an “all hands” evolution.  
The program sponsor regularly asks that the program report risk status.  As a stakeholder, 
the sponsor helps determine the criticality of program requirements.  All engineers, 
analysts, and support personnel with discrete responsibilities and assignments in the 
program should be cognizant of uncertainties associated with their cost, schedule, or 
technical area.  The common risk management and technical assessment process is 
designed to integrate the risk analysis with program cost, schedule, and systems 
engineering analyses.  It provides broad-based diagnostic scrutiny in order to support 
successful system acquisition. 
Table 2 presents an overview of risk management roles and responsibilities.  It 
should be emphasized that the program manager is ultimately responsible for the risk 
program as defined in the DoD 5000 series. 
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Risk Manager   
• Reports to the technical director with direct access to the program manager   
• Maintains an interdisciplinary understanding of program-wide risk 
• Is the central advocate for risk management including administrative 
responsibility for the program 
• Interfaces directly with industry risk managers, and maintains currency 
concerning status of industry reported risks  
• Coordinates with Functional Area Leaders (FALs) for assessment of industry 
risk issues and mitigation plans   
• Establishes and maintains risk management metrics on industry and 
government risk management progress  
• Facilitates risk assessments, provides appropriate risk assessment tools, and 
provides guidance to FALs for uniform display of risk issues  
• Maintains the program risk database   
• Produces and maintains a program risk watch list 
• Interfaces with the STAR panel to develop and adjudicate system risks and the 
program-wide risk watch list 
• Conducts training required in order for all program staff to execute the risk 
management program  
• Briefs the program manager on the status of program risk 
• Recommends independent risk assessments as required to support program 
objectives  
 
The following organizations and individuals have roles and responsibilities that 
are integral to the risk management program.  Their risk management responsibilities are 
described below. 
 Stakeholder Steering Board (SSB) 
Central to the process executed by the SSB is identification and assessment of 
program risks. Through extensive interaction with Cognizant Technical Authorities 
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(CTAs), the SSB identifies risks.  It also vets risk and critical integration areas as part of 
the TAP.  An important SSB function noted is the confirmation of what government 
resources need to be applied to resolve technical risks.  
System Technical Assessment and Review (STAR) Panel 
The STAR panel is integral to program risk management.  The panel is comprised 
of experienced executive-level acquisition professionals.  Because of their extensive 
experience, they are assigned the responsibility of adjudicating, modifying, and 
characterizing the program risks.  They will review the bottom-up risk assessments 
generated by functional areas, IPTs, and competing teams, and modify these assessments 
appropriately.  They will also perform top-down risk assessments using appropriate 
weighting tools provided by the risk IPT as required. 
 Tech Team 
Tech Team is a group comprised of primarily government specialists in the 
technical disciplines associated with system design and construction.  Cognizant 
Technical Authorities (CTAs) (e.g., Naval Surface Warfare Center, SEA 03, SEA 05) 
provide personnel who populate the Tech Team and work exclusively for the 
government.  The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the program and 
Tech Team includes the requirement to assess risk associated with the industry designs.  
Tech Team uses the TAP risk assessment process as well as periodic independent risk 
assessments in technical specialty areas.  As noted above, the Tech Team works closely 
with the SSB to assess and characterize industry risks. 
 Industry Risk Managers 
These managers develop, operate, and manage industry risk management 
programs that satisfy program and DoD objectives.  They coordinate efforts with the 
program risk manager to provide access to risk data in a readily usable format.  




D. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY IN 
RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS  
The government risk management program includes and leverages industry risk 
management programs.  Industry, in developing preliminary design options, must include 
risk management as an integral component of their overall program management and 
systems engineering processes.  The government risk manager maintains visibility and 
dialogue with industry so that clear understanding of risk processes, risks identified by 
industry, and risk mitigation progress are clearly understood.  This insight will be 
collected, analyzed, and used to assess industry designs and their potential for successful 
production and delivery of the system. 
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the Navy’s risk management program 
and industry’s.  The figure depicts identical risk processes being executed by the Navy 
and industry; however, industry has distinctive risk processes that are unique to their 
programs. 
In addition to assessing industry risk management programs, the Navy’s risk 
management assessment will examine industry team proposals, designs, and processes in 
the context of risk.  This process captures high and moderate risks not captured or 
mischaracterized by industry risk programs.  It provides for independent Navy 
assessments of the uncertainties associated with industry designs.  The basic building 
blocks of risk management, however, are comprised of the continuous four-step process 
depicted. The Navy risk management program interfaces with industry risk management 
to maintain insight and visibility in risk identification, assessment, analysis/mitigation, 
and monitoring/tracking, as shown. 
Individual risk items contain certain common elements that can be used to 
characterize the risk.  The quality assurance checklist, in Appendix I, is provided to assist 
risk assessors in obtaining the required program risk information.  Program metrics will 
be used to assess industry designs/plans.  In this manner, risk is independently assessed, 
characterized, and reported as the program proceeds.  Outputs of the risk management 
program derived through this interaction are listed in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.   Relationship between the Navy’s risk management program and industry’s 
risk management programs. 
E. TAP RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND PROCEDURES  
Continuous review of industry risks will be performed as illustrated in Figure 4.  
Dialogue with industry risk managers will be maintained by the risk IPT.  Significant 
findings and changes to status (missed milestones, schedule slippage, technology 
breakthroughs, risk retirement, et cetera) will be documented and included in the program 
risk characterization.  The risk manager will report these findings to the STAR panel on a 
regular basis. 
Risk management will employ an Integrated Assessment Tool (IAT) described in 
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risk analysis and management in an organized fashion.  The TAP instruction requires 
Assessment Area Leaders (AALs) to identify, analyze, and report high and moderate 
risks based upon government risk assessments.  The IAT is designed to assist government 
evaluators in executing this function. 
The TAP instruction provides an assessment structure.  A sample of that structure 
is depicted in Figure 5.  This structure, which assessment teams have some latitude to 
modify, is used as a baseline checklist to ensure that all program focus areas are analyzed 
for merits and deficiencies in industry-proposed solutions.  The IAT is populated with the 
identical hierarchy in order to assess risk across the evaluation spectrum.  Key 
Performance Parameters (KPPs) and key operational requirements are identified as 
program imperatives.  These are specifically noted in the TAP and IAT so that proposed 
solutions addressing KPPs and key operational requirements are given significantly more 
scrutiny because of their importance. 
 
 
Figure 5.   TAP Hierarchy – A Sample 
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Performing program risk assessment using the TAP structure as a reporting 
framework has significant advantages.  It assures that technical assessment risk analysis 
results are integrated into a consolidated assessment process and are linked together tying 
systems engineering, operational analysis, economic analysis, and business case analysis.  
















Figure 6.   Consolidated Assessment Process 
 
1. TAP Integrated Assessment Tool (IAT) 
Purpose:  The IAT is used as a tool to support program management and generate 
risk characterization reports for internal use and external reporting.   
Description:  The IAT is tailored to support program requirements.  It is 
comprised of two principal parts.  The first is an assessment input form that incorporates 
the TAP instruction hierarchy.  The assessment input form allows further decomposition 
to facilitate in-depth analysis of more complex focus areas.  The additional layers are 
primarily used to support operational performance categories where more analysis layers 
may be required. 
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The second part of the IAT is the standardized probability of failure (Pf) and 
consequence of failure (Cf) lookup tables to assist teams in assessing operational and 
development function risks using standardized program criteria.  This standardized risk 
characterization is consistent with critical program attributes (top level program 
objectives). 
The lookup tables are comprised of definitions linked to numerical scales that 
define the Pf and Cf.  Operational functions can be characterized in terms of product and 
process risks.  Development functions are characterized by process risks.  Separate tables, 
criteria, and metrics for product and process risks are provided in the sample lookup 
tables in Appendix J.   
a. Functional Assessments of Risks using the IAT 
As illustrated in Figure 7, the TAP is divided into operational and 
developmental risk functions.  The analytical processes for assessing an operational 
function as opposed to a development function can be quite different, requiring 
distinctive logic for each. 
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Figure 7.   Relationship between risk analysis and the TAP 
The TAP provides general guidance concerning the analytical processes 
for assessing probabilities and consequences of failure (Pf and Cf) for all operational and 
development functions.  It should be noted that some functional areas will have to adapt 
this general guidance to their own assessment process.   
b. Operational Functions 
Operational function analysis is illustrated on the left side of Figure 7.  
Operational functions are those functions that characterize system performance 
capabilities.  These are defined in terms of Required Operational Capabilities (ROC) and 
Planned Operational Environment (POE) using or employing a proposed Concept of 
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Pf Derivation:   For technical performance metrics associated with 
operational functions (i.e., MOEs, MOPs, KPPs), the compliance of the estimated 
performance with the required/expected Pf  value is expressed as the fraction of the 
estimated range of performance falling below the required value. The estimated range of 
performance shall take into account uncertainties in the estimates.  Figure 8 illustrates 
this concept. 
 
Figure 8.   Relationship between estimated value and required value. 
 
This same concept is applied to the comparison of operational suitability 
metric estimates with their required/expected values.  For example: comparison of (1) 
operational cost estimates to the appropriate budget threshold, (2) schedule estimates to 
threshold milestones, (3) availability estimates to threshold availability.  Use of this 
generic, engineering-based criterion helps normalize risk assessments across functional 
areas.  Grouping or designating risks by operational scenario is part of the TAP 
assessment process.  This grouping accommodates risk assessments for CONOPs 
variations.  Referencing Pf to a specific metric helps to focus the risk definition and 
facilitates mitigation. 
Cf Derivation:  Criticality is associated with each threshold 
requirement/expectation by assessing the failure consequences to the operational mission.  
This rating supports the integrated risk assessment described above.  Linkage of mission 
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level consequences to a lower-level metric failure should consider the effects of 
system/CONOPS design (e.g., from system redundancies).  
c. Development Functions 
Development function analysis is depicted on the right side of Figure 7.  
As illustrated in Figure 7, the metrics used to assess development functions are broadly 
categorized into two components—management and systems engineering.  The 
distinctions of these two categories are discussed below. 
(1) Management:  The program management process controls the 
program participants’ overall execution and control of the program.  It includes 
integration and coordination of all other processes applied to the program as well as an 
optimal allocation of resources.  It provides for communications with all of the program’s 
stakeholders so that their functionality and roles are facilitated in an efficient, cost 
conscious manner.  Principal management components are discussed below: 
Planning:  The planning process includes the capability to forecast, 
assess, anticipate, assign, and document resources in a proactive manner.  It provides 
cost, schedule, and technical baselines from which the program can proceed. 
Monitoring and Control:  This process includes the capability to 
track and assess performance against established baselines, to reallocate resources to 
meet objectives, to ensure that contractual and other commitments are fully met, and to 
provide rigor and  order across all disciplines in the program.  It is an iterative process 
facilitated by robust communications with all participants. 
Improvement:  This spiral process leverages corporate and 
personnel experience.  It includes technology insertion, personnel training, and 
capitalization on lessons learned from programs of similar complexity.  Management sets 
improvement objectives with appropriate metrics and implementation schemas such as 
statistical process control.  Quality certification is usually a credential that ensures 
appropriate improvement processes and philosophies are in place. 
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(2) Systems Engineering:  The systems engineering process is the 
governing technical management process leading to product development.  The product 
or collection of products addresses all aspects of system performance.  Systems 
engineering provides the primary technical interface and integration with other key 
processes.  Collectively, systems engineering ensures that all cost, technical, and 
schedule requirements are met.  The primary components of systems engineering are 
presented below: 
Requirements Definition:  This process represents the ability to 
analyze and understand user requirements stipulated in top-level documents (e.g., Initial 
Capabilities Document, Capabilities Development Document, etc.) and translates them 
into a system that addresses the entire life cycle.  Requirements are usually assessed via 
modeling and simulation, war-gaming, and other operations analysis tools that facilitate 
full understanding of requirements.  Performance parameters, interoperability, testability, 
supportability, and other constraints are considered in the assessment process.  Tools, 
such as prototypes and computer simulations, facilitate cost effective traceability and 
therefore are critical to requirements definition and synthesis. 
Design:  Design is a multifaceted process that begins with 
functional allocation and ultimately yields a product baseline.  Synthesis, or preliminary 
or detail design, translates the functional and performance requirements into a description 
of the complete system that satisfies requirements.  Solutions are incrementally defined 
as the design process is executed, and are comprised of specifications and drawings that 
serve as the baseline for transition to production. 
Production:  The production process is the ability to produce the 
system, subsystems, and components that comprise the design.  The production process is 
characterized in terms of processes, facilities, personnel, planning, and other appropriate 
resources necessary to manufacture, fabricate, integrate, or assemble the system. 
Evaluation:  Evaluation is comprised of analysis, simulation, 
testing, and validation functions that incrementally determine progress in satisfying the 
technical requirements and program objectives.  Technical management, configuration 
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management, deficiency reporting, risk management, performance-based product 
management, and other diagnostics are central to the process. 
Development functions are assessed in relation to best practices.  
Pf is expressed as a function that indicates the degree of variance from these best 
practices.  The estimated range of performance in the TAP tool takes into account 
uncertainties in the estimates.  The Cf is derived by assessing the development function’s 
impact on the program objectives and the operational mission.  Appendix K provides a 
list of sample development functional assessment questions evaluators might consider in 
assessing competitor processes against best practices. 
d. Risk Analysis Characterization Using IAT 
In general, each element in the TAP hierarchy can be represented by a 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) as described with appropriate metrics.  Operational 
metrics are usually defined by measures such as range, speed, or endurance.  
Developmental metrics are defined in terms of measures such as schedule maturity, 
number of qualified people, or past performance record.  Using these metrics, a range of 
desired performance is established and recorded in the IAT.  This data can be presented 
graphically in a histogram. 
(1) Risk Definition within the IAT. The IAT captures risk 
definition information including title, description, and analysis source.  These data are 
useful in providing additional details beyond those derived in calculating Rf.  Functional 
assessment teams can characterize their areas in some detail by populating these fields. 
e. Risk Mitigation within the IAT 
Following the identification and assessment of a high or moderate risk, a 
plan to mitigate or reduce the risk needs to be developed.  The IAT allows evaluators to 
capture and assess these mitigation plans.   
Data concerning the entire mitigation plan picture can be captured by the 
IAT.  Data/information includes a mitigation plan summary, cost and schedule 
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requirements, assessment of how the contractor has funded and scheduled execution of 
the mitigation plans, and other trend/assessment data.  Analysis of this data/information 
in the IAT will facilitate the assessment of mitigation plan adequacy. 
F. RISK MITIGATION GUIDANCE 
High and moderate risks require mitigation plans.  Many tasks in a mitigation plan 
will be peculiar to the type of risk being anticipated, however, some mitigation 
techniques apply to more than one risk type.  These are included in the program 
acquisition strategy based upon lessons learned and analyses of other programs.  Several 
of these proven techniques are listed below: 
• Communications venues in the mitigation plan, such as government 
participation in IPTs, or collaborative work structures, are good mitigation 
process techniques.   
• Modeling and simulation should be used to design, test, build, and operate 
ships in a computer environment before building hardware. 
• The use of government and contractor testing, especially in the early stages 
of development, can help to evaluate design solutions related to risk 
mitigation.  Land based engineering sites can be useful in the risk mitigation 
effort. 
• The contractor should develop, and the Navy review, the system performance 
and physical specs. This allows a systematic approach to evaluating, 
understanding, and integrating the design. 
• The use of trade studies should apply to a wide number of risk mitigation 
plans. 
• Design reviews are an excellent forum for technical personnel to provide 
candid feedback on efforts to control and mitigate risk. 
• Risk management should be proactive and include methods to identify, 
assess, track, and mitigate risk throughout the organization. 
• The design requirements should stress features that are both upgradeable and 




III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Establishing a common risk management process and tool can improve the U.S. 
Navy’s execution of technical authority by targeting compliance with technical criteria 
and standards from the earliest stages of program development during evolution of the 
program acquisition strategy throughout the program’s life cycle.  A successful strategy 
needs to provide the industry sufficient time to fully develop plans and deliver products, 
especially in program high-risk areas, and incorporate a systems engineering process 
where the technical authorities can perform their mission.  If technical risks are not 
adequately addressed, history has shown that costs will increase.  
A. ADVANTAGES OF A COMMON RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
A common risk management and technical assessment process helps focus 
program management attention on areas of uncertainty that pose threats to program 
success. It helps: 
• Define, assess, and monitor metrics used to indicate program health 
• Assess and characterize risks from government’s perspective 
o Set prioritizes based upon criticality of system and acquisition 
requirements 
o Establish (adjust) risk tolerance/risk acceptance levels to optimize return 
on investment 
• Provide program personnel the means to implement risk management 
routinely and ensures process is practiced and understood by all program 
participants 
Successful risk management is highly dependent upon the degree of interaction 
between the program management, risk management, and systems engineering 
disciplines.  Success is also dependent upon standardization and consistent application of 
risk assessment criteria that are traceable to overall program objectives. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis achieved its purpose of improving execution of technical authority by 
defining the relationship between program authority and technical authority and 
describing how to assess and improve the state of technical authority through common 
policy development and implementation.  Still, more work needs to be done.  Future 
research necessary to help the SYSCOMs implement a common risk management 
process includes development and deployment of an Integrated Assessment Tool (IAT).  
Future research also needs to include promulgating a common policy for developing 
Systems Engineering Plans, a common technical review process, a common total 
platform and interoperability certification process, and a common systems engineering 
training program. 
Implementation of the recommendations provided by this thesis will improve 
communication and coordination of acquisition risks between the SYSCOMs newly-
established program management and technical competencies, which will substantially 
reduce the U.S. Navy’s risk and cost exposure on all current and future acquisition 
programs. 
 37
APPENDIX A — RISK TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 
Term Definition 
CAIV Cost as an Independent Variable is a performance trade off approach 
which establishes cost as a hard constraint on selection of capability 
and confidence investments. 
Campaign The highest level (strategic) objectives of a military solution to a broad 
threat situation. Composed of a number of mission objectives. 
Certification The act of attesting by report, letter, certificate, or message that 
performance of an equipment or system meets prescribed criteria.  The 
word carries the connotation of a guarantee.  
Compliance The difference between measured or estimated performance and 
required performance. 
Confidence A metric for the uncertainty that the estimate of predicted performance 
will be realized.  A component of technical risk assessment 
encompasses the confidence bounds of a distribution and the 
uncertainty in the distribution itself.  
CONOPS Concept of Operations — defines system use (functional allocation and 
execution). Includes strategic and tactical guidance and their governing 
doctrine and rules of engagement.  Reflects both operational 
constraints and system/technology requirements. 
Consequence 
(Cf) 
See Section 1.2 
Correlation, 
Metric 
Interdependence of metric values. 
Cost Model Relates total ship design to life cycle cost. When capability and 
confidence are analytically linked cost, CAIV-based design trades can 
be made. 
Criticality A function attribute that indicates the importance of the function to 
system-level capability. 
CTP Critical Technical Parameters are metrics of special interest to test 
oversight at the program manager and test activity levels. This term 
includes KPPs and additional metrics specified by such oversight or in 
the ICD. 
Demonstration A test focused on a specific outcome (usually one having a high 
probability of success). 
Direct 
Observations 
Performance or compliance distribution or metric values derived from 
test measurements of the subject function output. 
Distribution The spectrum of performance or compliance metric value variations 
due to intrinsic variability or to scenario influences. 
DRM Design Reference Mission is a collection of scenarios to be used as 
design and evaluation benchmarks. The collection addresses 
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Term Definition 
assignments of all durations from campaign to engagement and so 
serves as a reference for Total System Systems Engineering. 
Effectiveness 
Model 
A description of how MOEs or MOSs depend on MOPs. High fidelity 
models could include MOP dependencies on lower-level metrics and 
operating conditions. 
Engagement Fundamental warfare area tasks for prosecution of one or many 
specific threats within the associated threat category.   
Exit Criteria Conditions specified in the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) 
which must be met before the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) 
will allow a program to proceed into the next phase of development. 
May include indicators that selected KPPs or CTPs thresholds can be 
met. 
KPP Key Performance Parameters are metrics of particular interest to 
oversight. Achieving their threshold values is essential for program 
continuation. The ICD defines them.  
Measure An “instrumentable” representation of a function outcome. 
Metric See Appendix B. 
Mission Intermediate objectives of a military action. Comprised of a number of 
operations separated by platform availability activities (transit, re-
supply, crewing, recovery, et cetera) 
Model A descriptive, algorithmic, data-based, or physical representation of a 
system, procedure, or environment. See Simulation. 
MOE Measures of Effectiveness are metrics associated with high-level, 
design-independent, functions, which specify government’s interest in 
what needs to be done. The term is derived from the per-function 
effectiveness metrics because high-level function outputs are usually 
binary (already stated in terms of a desired outcome) so that 
performance and compliance distributions are equivalent. Values 
generated by effectiveness models.  May be decomposed into MOPs. 
MOP Measures of Performance are metrics associated with intermediate 
functions which may be design dependent, and reflect how industry 
plans to meet the need through integration of technology.  The term is 
derived from the per-function performance metrics of high interest to 
designers at this functional level.  May be decomposed into TPs. 
MOS Measures of Suitability – Same as MOE, but keyed to secondary 
(resource) outputs, or to any function supporting primary output 
availability. 
Observability The confidence with which a metric value can be estimated by 
reduction of test data.  A function of data quality and the sensitivity of 
the metric to the directly observed function. 
Operation The tactical objectives of a military action.  Comprised of a sequence 
of engagements, possibly executed concurrently across warfare areas to 
address simultaneous threats. 
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Term Definition 
OPSIT Operational situation describes the scenario for an operation, the 
organic functions to be applied, and the external assets available for 
use. 
OSA Open Systems Architecture supports flexible system upgrades through 
modular design. 
Outcome A general term for the result of a specific test or evaluation. A direct 
observation. 
Parameter A general term referring to any of a set of elements used to describe the 
characteristics or behavior of something.  Scenario parameters include 
environment, threat and CONOPS parameters. 
Performance 
Metric 
The basic representation of function output. Measurable values 
(continuous or discrete) whose distribution is determined by external 
operating conditions and intrinsic system capability. Computed 




Sub-system models which generate MOP values. They represent 
execution of intermediate, design-dependent functions and integrate 
technology models.  
Probability (Pf) See Section 1.2. 
Process The set of steps used to accomplish a function. 
Product The hardware or software delivery made in response to a requirement. 
Risk See Section 1.2. 
Risk 
Assessment 
The process of identifying and analyzing program areas and critical 
technical process risks to increase the likelihood of meeting cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives.  Risk identification is the 
process of examining the program areas and each critical technical 
process to identify and document the associated risk.  Risk analysis is 
the process of examining each identified risk area or process to refine 
the description of the risk, isolating the cause, and determining the 
effects.  It includes risk rating and prioritization in which risk events 
are defined in terms of their probability of occurrence, severity of 




The recording, maintaining, and reporting assessments, handling 
analysis and plans, and monitoring results.  It includes all plans, reports 
for the program manager and decision authorities, and reporting forms 
that may be internal to the PMO. 
Risk Events Things that could go wrong for a program or system, are elements of 
an acquisition program that should be assessed to determine the level 
of risk.  The events should be defined to a level that an individual can 
comprehend the potential impact and its causes.  For example, a 
potential risk event for a turbine engine could be turbine blade 
vibration.  There could be a series of potential risk events that should 
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Term Definition 
be selected, examined, and assessed by subject-matter experts.  The 
relationship between the two components of risk--probability and 
consequence—is complex.  To avoid obscuring the results of an 
assessment, the risk associated with an event should be characterized in 
terms of its two components.  There is still a need for backup 
documentation containing the supporting data and assessment 
rationale. 
Risk Handling The process that identifies, evaluates, selects, and implements options 
in order to set risk at acceptable levels given program constraints and 
objectives.  This includes the specifics on what should be done, when it 
should be accomplished, who is responsible, and associated cost and 
schedule.  The most appropriate strategy is selected from these 
handling options.  Risk handling is an all-encompassing term whereas 
risk mitigation is one subset of risk handling. 
Risk 
Monitoring 
The process that systematically tracks and evaluates the performance of 
risk-handling actions again established metrics throughout the 
acquisition process and develops further risk-handling options, as 
appropriate. 
Risk Planning The process of developing and documenting an organized, 
comprehensive, and interactive strategy and methods for identifying 
and tracking risk areas, developing risk-handling plans, performing 
continuous risk assessments to determine how risks have changed, and 
assigning adequate resources. 
Scenario The operational context for system employment. Includes specification 
of threat and physical environments, defended assets, available external 
resources, and constraints on operations (CONOPS). 
Simulation The execution of a model to show dynamic effects. May be conceptual, 
constructive, virtual, or live (rehearsal). 
System A physical view of the functional hierarchy. “System”, “sub-system”, 
and “component” refer to physical views of high-, intermediate-, and 
low-level function groupings respectively.  “System of Systems” (SoS) 
is a collection of inter-operating systems. Development optimizes 
system capability within programmatic constraints and within the 
context of possible participation in a SoS. 
Test The collection of direct observations of real-world function outcomes. 
Testability The capability to determine a metric value with required confidence 
within cost and schedule constraints. 
Threat A probable danger or negative consequence. 
Utility Indicates significance or usefulness. 
Validation The process of determining the manner and degree to which a model is 
an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the 
intended uses of the model. 
Verification The process of determining that a model implementation accurately 
represents the developer’s conceptual description and specifications. 
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APPENDIX B — RISK METRICS 
Risk management metrics comprise two basic categories.  The first is risk 
management program metrics.  These metrics indicate the quality and effectiveness of the 
risk management program.  Using an Integrated Assessment Tool (IAT) and TAP 
process, significant data/information can be assembled that are used to characterize the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the overall risk management program. 
The second metric category provides insight and understanding as to the overall 
health of the program relative to technical, cost, and schedule parameters.  These metrics 
can be subdivided into various regimes depending upon the product or process being 
examined.  Program metrics, including cost and schedule measures, are increasingly 
given added attention because budgetary constraints and the drive to leverage technology.   
Examples of these two categories of risk metrics are presented below: 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM METRICS 
These metrics are statistical characterizations of the risk management program.  
Executive level metrics reporting performed by the risk manager and the STAR panel 
include: 
• A prioritized number of high, moderate, and low risks segregated by 
industry and by risks unique to the Navy. 
• An indication of the rate of change in the numbers of risks by category 
indicating how risk management is evolving. 
• An indication of risk handling or mitigation progress over time. 
The examples that follow are by no means all-inclusive, but are presented to 















High     
Moderate     
Low     
Retired     
 
The TAP and IAT facilitate the collection of metric data related to metric utility 
and risk uncertainty levels.  Collection of this data may enhance understanding of the risk 
management program. 
PROGRAM HEALTH METRICS 
By focusing performance measurements on the most critical engineering product 
development processes and results, the program will ensure that Fleet and DoD needs are 
met.  The program KPPs and key operations requirements objectives must be met and 
metrics assessing the designs help the program determine both overall and incremental 
progress against those objectives.  In general, these metrics provide system performance 
measures such as speed, rates of fire, endurance, power requirements, and others.  
Individual assessment areas will define metrics related to risks in the TAP.  ASN 
(RD&A) guidance suggests that engineering metrics be divided into design, test, and 
production metric categories.  These categories have been decomposed into numerous 
sub-components that should be considered by evaluators.  The following tables are 
provided to assist program risk assessment personnel. 
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PROCESS METRICS EXAMPLES 
(Source: “Methods and Metrics for Product Success” ASN RDA) 
Category Subcategory Examples 
Design Design Reference Mission 
Profile 
Contractor has developed functional profiles 
defined in terms of time, level of severity, 
frequency of cycles for both wartime and 
peacetime.  Profiles include Life Cycle 
Support and associated costs. 
 Design Requirements Requirements are verified at the Systems 
Requirements Review (SRR). 
 Trade Studies Trade studies are prioritized against design 
requirements. 
 Design Policy Design policy is promulgated across 
industry team and integrated. 
 Design Process Design has been analyzed for cost, 
performance, manning, etc. 
 Design Analysis Appropriate standardized design analyses 
are ongoing, identified, or scheduled (e.g. 
Stress Analysis, Stability Analysis, Sneak 
Circuit Analysis, etc.) 
 Parts and Materials 
Selection 
What de-rating criteria are used?  (There are 
hundreds of criteria in this area depending 
on item.) 
 Software Design Independently established software 
certification credentials. 
 Computer Aided Design Percent of design activity that is computer 
aided. 
 Design for Testing Are Human Factors considered in the test 
program. 
 Built-in Test (BIT) Criteria used for determining BIT; cost of 
BIT 
 Configuration Control Configuration Management Plan 
completeness and cross team adoption of the 
Plan. 
 Design Reviews Percent of design completion at Design 
Review milestones (e.g., 20% at PDR) 
 Design Release Projected versus actual engineering man-
hours expended 
Test Integrated Test Plan Integrated Test Plan covers all disciplines. 
 Failure Reporting System Is there a corporate failure reporting policy? 
 Uniform Test Report Standard test reporting formats established 
across the team. 




Category Subcategory Examples 
 Design Limit Percentage of hardware validated at extreme 
limits. 
 Life The contractor draws life test environments 
from operational mission profiles. 
 Test, Analyze, and Fix Test environments are based on worst case 
mission profile extremes. 
 Field Feedback Problem and failure data available in real 
time to appropriate personnel. 
Production Manufacturing Plan Manufacturing is included in the design 
process. 
 Quality of Manufacturing 
Process 
Quality certification credentials have been 
obtained. 
 Piece Part Control Do suppliers certify quality levels? 
 Subcontractor Control Are technical issues included in 
subcontractor agreements (not just cost and 
contractual)? 
 Defect Control Is the defect reduction program 
demonstrated on previous programs 
effective? 
 Tool Planning Are trade studies used to assess cost 
effective tool selection and procurement? 
 Special Test Equipment Are market surveys conducted to justify 
special test equipment? 
 Computer Aided 
Manufacturing (CAM) 
What percentage of machine processing is 
performed by CAM? 





EXAMPLES OF PRODUCT-RELATED METRICS 
(Source: “Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition) 
Category Subcategory Examples 
Engineering Key Design Parameters Weight  
  Size 
  Range 
  Endurance 
 Design Maturity Open Problem Reports 
  Number of Change 
Proposals 
  Number of Drawings 
Released 
Production Unit Production Cost   
 Material Availability  
Support Manpower Availability  
 Special Tools  
 Test Equipment  
Lifecycle Cost Cost per Steaming Hour  
 Crew Size  
   
 
 
EXAMPLES OF COST AND SCHEDULE RELATED METRICS 







Cost variance  Schedule variance 
Cost performance index Schedule performance 
index 
Estimate at completion Design schedule 
performance 
Management reserve Manufacturing schedule 
performance 
 Test schedule performance 
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APPENDIX C — ASSESSMENT OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAMS  
 Industry risk management programs will be assessed and evaluated through the 
review of ongoing risk management programs, deliverables associated with the programs, 
and proposed solutions for future risk management execution.  Industry will be 
encouraged to seek and propose creative, cost effective risk management solutions.  
Industry will be evaluated in terms of risk management products, risk management 
processes, teamwork/integration with the industry/government structure, and proposed 
risk management tools.  They will also be assessed in terms of their risk evaluation 
processes and the quality of their mitigation planning process.  Criteria considered in 
evaluating these areas are presented below. 
 
1.0 Industry Risk Management Programs 
 
 1.1 Risk Management Products 
 
Definition: The development and delivery of risk management team products, 
including a risk management plan, risk watch list, risk assessment criteria, 
periodic risk status reports, and risk training instruction; the integration of risk 
management into other product deliverables, including the TEMP and ITP. 
 
Assessment Indicators:  
• Has the risk management team (RMT) provided a risk management plan 
(RMP)? 
− Does the RMP provide an organized, comprehensive, interactive risk 
management strategy?  Is the RMP in accordance with the program 
manager’s risk management strategy? 
− Does the RMP define how to integrate risk management into the technical 
assessment process using systems engineering principles? 
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− Does the plan provide guidelines for risk identification, assessment, 
mitigation plan development, monitoring, and reporting? 
− Does the plan provide the functional interface between IPT members, IPT 
risk representatives, and the RMT? 
• Has the RMT provided training to IPTs to incorporate risk management into 
their technical assessment process, to properly assess risk, and to 
appropriately and effectively plan for and carry out risk mitigation activities? 
• Do test plan deliverables adequately link testing to risk reduction? 
 
 1.2 Risk Management Processes 
 
Definition: The implementation of the risk management plan, including the 
functional interface and process flow between the IPTs and risk management 
team.  The IPTs identify and assess risk according to the risk management plan, 
develop mitigation plans, and report risk in the risk database tracking tool. 
 
 Assessment Indicators: 
• Has the RMT updated the RMP to suit its current requirements, including 
response to changes in acquisition strategy, or preparation of major decision 
milestones? 
• Does the risk management process promote benchmarking evaluation 
processes against best practices? 
• Does the RMP address risk process flow to define the interface between 
program management, the IPTs, and the RMT? 





Definition:  The organizational structure of the risk management team, 
including risk manager and support staff, and risk representatives from 
program management and the IPTs. 
Assessment Indicators: 
• Is the RMT adequately staffed and funded? 
• Is the Program Management Team actively participating? 
• Do the IPTs have designated risk representatives which interface with 
the RMT? 
• Does the RMT meet regularly with the PM and IPTs to ensure that the 
RMP is properly and continuously being executed? 
• Is the RMT staffed properly with experienced systems engineers 
trained in risk management? 
• Does the RMT promote communication between IPT risk 
representatives to identify cross-functional risks?   
• Does the RMT identify system-level risks? 
 
1.4 Risk Management Tools 
 
Definition:  The functional element developed by the Risk Management 
Team and used by the IPTs to enter, monitor, and report identified risks 
and associated mitigation plans.  Provides the capability to report risk 
metrics and risk status. 
Assessment Indicators: 
• Has the RMT provided a risk database tool for risk monitoring, 
tracking, and reporting? 
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• Does the tool include self-contained training for risk definition and 
assessment? 
• Does the tool provide for the inclusion of effectiveness (technical 
performance) and suitability (cost and schedule exposure) metrics within 
risk records? 
• Does the tool provide for the reporting of watch lists? 
• Does the tool provide for the reporting of risk metrics? 
• Does the tool provide for the reporting of program risk status? 
• Does the tool provide for linking reported risks to the IMS, tests, 
demonstrations, and budget items? 
 
2.0 Evaluating Risk 
 
 2.1 Assessing Risk 
 
Definition:  The establishment of criteria to assess risk, including criteria for 
probability/likelihood of shortfall relative to a requirement or expectation, 
consequence of shortfall event should it occur, and resulting risk level (criteria for 
High, Moderate, and Low risk). 
 
Metrics: 
• Number and Percentage of active risks based on failure to meet specified 
requirement/expectation 
• Average Age of Active Risks (also average of High, Moderate, Low) 
 
Assessment Indicators: 
• Are risk assessments consistent with the definitions in the RMP? 
• Are risk assessments consistent with (government) program RMP definitions?  
Are industry assessed high risks of high risk to (government) program? 
• Do industry risks adequately span (government) program risks? 
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 2.2 Establishing Mitigation Plans 
Definition: The development of activities intended to reduce identified risk to 
manageable and acceptable levels.  Ensure that developed plans are executable 
within critical time constraints. 
 
Metrics: 
• Number and Percentage of High and Moderate Risks without Mitigation Plans 
• Percentage of mitigation tasks budgeted 
• Percentage of mitigation tasks scheduled 
 
Assessment Indicators: 
• Are mitigation plans developed for High and Moderate risks?  Are these plans 
captured in a Risk Mitigation Plan deliverable? 
• Do mitigation tasks meet program schedule constraints? 
• Are mitigation tasks linked to the IMS? 
• Are mitigation tasks formally budgeted? 
• Are mitigation tasks linked to demonstrations/tests? 
3.0 Monitoring Risk 
 
Definition: The continuous process of systematically tracking and evaluating 
the performance of risk-handling actions against established metrics.  Conduct 
periodic reassessments of program risk to evaluate current and new risks.  Identify 
additional risk-handling options. 
 
3.1 Mitigation Activity Status 
 
Definition: Monitor the status of risk mitigation activities to ensure that they 





• Number and Percentage of High/Moderate risks with overdue mitigation plans 




• Is industry on course to mitigate risk? 
 
 3.2 Reporting Risk 
 
Definition: Recording, maintaining, and reporting assessments, handling 
analysis and plans, and monitoring results. 
 
Assessment Indicators: 
• Is industry reporting accurate, timely, and relevant risk information in a clear, 
easily understood manner? 
• Are risk reports generated by industry at regular intervals?   




APPENDIX D — PROGRAM RISK CHARACTERIZATION CHARTS – A SAMPLE 
























 B    A    DD 21
B A Land Attack
B A Air Dominance
B A Surface Dominance
B A Undersea Dominance
B A Information Dominance
B A Combat Support
 B    A    Ship Systems
B A Integrated Ship Systems
B A Integrated Topside Design
B A Integrated Hullform Propulsor




B A Environmental, Safety & Health
B A Hull Systems
B A Auxiliary Systems
B A Propulsion & Power Systems
B A Ship Systems Controls
B A Land Attack System Design
B A Air Dominance System Design
B A Undersea Dominance
B A Mine Warfare System Design
B A Anti-Surface Warfare System Design
B A Operations Other Than War
 B    A    C3ISR
 B    A   System Effectiveness B   A   Technical Design
 B    A    Combat System Design
 B    A    Total Ship Computing
B A System Architecture
B A Software Engineering
B A Software Certification
B A Physical Implementation
B A Forward Presence/
Independence
B A MAGTAF / ARG
B A CVBG Ops
B A SVG Ops
 B    A    Maritime Dominance
B A Local Air Dominance
B A Surface Dominance /
MOOTW
B A Undersea Dominance /
Mine Reconnaissance /
Avoidance
B A Command and Control
B A Information Dominance
B A Multi-Mission Warfare
B A Get There
B A Stay There
B A Return Safely
B A Get There
B A Stay There
B A Return Safely
 B    A    Ship’s Crew
B A Manpower Require-
ments
B A Human Performance
B A Quality of Life
B A Human Systems
Engineering Process
 B    A    Survivability
 B    A    Mobility
 B    A    Land  Attack
High = Likely to cause serious disruption of schedule,
increase in cost, or degradation of performance even with
special contractor emphasis and close government monitoring.
Medium = May cause significant disruption of schedule,
increase in cost, or degradation of performance.  However,
special contractor emphasis and close government monitoring
will probably be able to overcome difficulties.
Low = Has little potential to cause disruption of schedule,
increase in cost, or degradation of performance.  Normal
contractor effort and normal government monitoring will probably
be able to overcome uncertainties.
B    =  Before Mitigation
A    = After Mitigation
 B    A    Readiness & Logistic
               Support
B A Management
B A Design Influence
B A Support System Architecture
B A Support System Infrastructure
B A SPM Core
B A Analysis / Performance
B A Life Cycle
B A Facilities Requirements
B A Management
 B    A    Smart Product Model
 B   A   Life Cycle Engineering & Support
 B    A    Personnel & Manpower
 B    A    Training
B A Personal Concept





 B    A     Modernization &
                 Disposal
B A Training Capacity
B A Training Concept
B A Product Data Management
B A ERP / MRP
B A Logistics Tool Support
B A Infrastructure
 B    A    Integrated Data Environment













Note: Risk Data to be determined.  
Chart does not reflect Risk 
Status. 
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 B    A    DD 21
 B    A           Total Cost
 B    A       RDT&E
B A Program Management
B A Ship Systems
B A Mission Systems
B A Horizontals
B A Test & Evaluation
B A Life Cycle Support
B A Integrated Data
Environment
B A Modeling &
Simulation
 B    A    Operations & Support
B A Mission Personnel
B A Unit Level Consumption
B A Intermediate Maintenance
B A Depot Maintenance
B A Contractor Support
B A Sustaining Support
B A Indirect Support
 B    A    Other TOC Impacts
B A Disposal
B A Load Outs
B A Offboard Assets
B A Cost Avoidance
B A Infrastructure
 B    A    Earned Value Performance
 B   A   Management
B A Coordination of SPY-3
Development
B A Effectiveness of
CVN 77 Relationships
B A Effectiveness of AGS
Relationship
B A Effectiveness of IUSW
Peer Group
Participation
B A Effectiveness of
WSESRB Relationship
B A Effectiveness of Subtier
Activity Relationships
B A Approved Certification
Authorities
 B    A       Production
B A Plans
B A Ship Construction (Ship
Platform
B A Ship Construction
(Mission Systems)
B A Contractors Engineering
Changes
B A Initial Spares & Repair
Parts
B A Initial Training & Training
Equipment
B A Post Delivery & Outfit
B A Shock Testing
B A Cost / Schedule Performance
B A Completeness / Clarity of
Reporting
B A Management Focus
 B    A    Program Management
               Performance
B A CWD Quality
B A IMP Quality
B A IMS Quality
B A Quality / Timeliness of
Deliverables
B A Calendar / Scheduling
of Events
B A Meeting Quality /
Effectiveness





B A Monitoring / Tracking
 B    A       Risk Management
 B    A       Security
B A Security
Management
 B    A     Third Party
                 Coordination
High = Likely to cause serious disruption of schedule,
increase in cost, or degradation of performance even with
special contractor emphasis and close government monitoring.
Medium = May cause significant disruption of schedule,
increase in cost, or degradation of performance.  However,
special contractor emphasis and close government monitoring
will probably be able to overcome difficulties.
Low = Has little potential to cause disruption of schedule,
increase in cost, or degradation of performance.  Normal
contractor effort and normal government monitoring will probably
be able to overcome uncertainties.
B    =  Before Mitigation
A    = After Mitigation
Note: Risk Data to be determined.  Chart does 
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APPENDIX E — RISK CONTROL ALTERNATIVES 
 
Risk Category Risk Control Alternatives 
Technical • Multiple development efforts 
• Alternative Designs 
• Trade Studies 
• Early prototyping 
• Incremental Development 
• Technology maturation efforts 
• Robust design 
• Reviews, walk-throughs, and inspections 
• Design of experiments 
• Open systems 
• Use of Standard items/software reuse 
• Two-phased engineering and manufacturing 
development 
• Use of mock-ups 
• Modeling and simulation 
• Key parameter control boards 
• Manufacturing screening 
Schedule • Multiple development efforts • Alternative Designs 
• Trade Studies  
• Modeling and simulation 
• Key parameter control boards 
Cost • Multiple development efforts • Alternative Designs 
• Trade Studies 
• Incremental Development 
• Technology maturation efforts 
• Open systems 
• Use of Standard items/software reuse 
• Use of mock-ups 
• Modeling and simulation 
• Key parameter control boards 
• Manufacturing screening 
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APPENDIX F — METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING RISKS 
The following include some (but not all) recommended methods for identifying risk:  
 
 a. Best Judgment is the knowledge and experience of the collective multi-
disciplined IPT members and is the most common source of risk identification. 
 
 b. Understanding the Prime Contractor’s critical processes is key to 
recognizing, and therefore identifying risk.  The amount of deviation from considered 
best practices relates to the level of risk being encountered. 
 
 c. Understanding the Subcontractors’ critical processes is just as important as 
understanding the Prime’s.  Visibility into Subcontractor processes has not been common 
practice but should be because of the potential impact to program cost, schedule and 
performance. 
 
 d. New Processes should always receive dedicated attention, whether they are 
related to design, analysis, or production.  Until they are validated and until the people 
who implement them have been trained and have experience in successfully using these 
processes, there is risk. 
 
 e. Any Process Lacking Rigor should also be suspect; as it is inherently risky.  
To have rigor, a process should be documented, it should have been validated, and it 
should be strictly followed. 
 
 f. Lessons Learned from similar processes can serve as a baseline for the 
successful way to achieve requirements.  If there is a departure from the successful way, 
there may be risk. 
 
 g. Defining an Unknown, or defining all unknowns, is being proactive in risk 
management.  A team (e.g., IPT) approach is essential because some unknowns may be 
“known” to certain members and “unknown” to others.  Collectively, the team should be 
able to list all the unknowns.  Unknowns include incomplete design efforts, testing not 
yet performed, and similar unfinished work.  The challenge is to define the unknowns, 
identify the resources (people, funds, time, tools and materials) needed to complete the 
work (making them “knowns”), then monitoring these plans to completion. Unknowns 
are risk areas until they are defined, the necessary actions are planned, and the required 
effort is found to be within the scope of cost and schedule estimates. 
 
 h. Changing Requirements contain inherent risk in completing the job on 




 i. Test Failure may indicate corrective action is necessary.  Some corrective 
actions may not fit available resources, or the schedule, and (for other reasons as well) 
may contain risk which needs to be addressed. 
 
j. Negative Trends or Forecasts are cause for concern (risk) and may require 
specific actions to turn around. 
 
 k. Qualified Supplier Availability is key to keeping risk LOW.  A supplier who 
is not experienced with the processes for designing and producing a specific product is 
not a qualified supplier.  To qualify, a supplier may require resources that have not been 
planned and therefore this risk issue must be addressed. 
 
 l. Lack of Resources: People, Funds, Time, Tools, and Materials are necessary 
ingredients for successfully implementing a process. If any is inadequate, there is risk. 
 
 m. Unqualified People: Knowledge and Experience (and possibly other 
attributes) may not fit the processes being implemented.  When there isn’t a fit, there is 
risk. 
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APPENDIX G — RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL BOX 
These tools are briefly described below and can support all four steps of the risk 
management process.  The tool box is not intended to be all inclusive, providing only a 
selection of proven tools used by similar programs.  Other tools, such as those from the 
commercial sector, from other programs, or the software vendor community can also 
support the program risk management process. 
 
 a. Risk Management Plan.  As its name implies, this document defines the risk 
management and risk assessment processes.  Changes to these processes will be reflected 
in this document as they occur. 
 
 b. DoD 4245.7-M, “Transition from Development to Production,” is often called 
the “Templates” manual because it identifies technical risk areas as experienced by 
leading industry experts and provides, in “bullet” form, suggestions for avoiding those 
risks. The manual lacks detail, addressing historic technical considerations of product 
design, test, and production to help managers be proactive in managing risk.   It focuses 
on activity necessary for optimum readiness for production.  The chapters describe an 
overall Design process that emphasizes understanding all the stresses that can cause the 
product to fail during its operating life and encourages the use of design margins to 
accommodate those stresses while striving for early design maturity.  They describe a 
Test process that verifies that the product is designed to worst-case stress conditions and 
is mature before it is released to production.  They describe a Production process that 
ensures that the manufacturing process/processes are qualified and that the design can be 
“built to print.”  Chapters on Funding, Facilities, Logistics, and Management may prove 
useful in identifying weak areas of program planned processes early enough to implement 




 c. The NAVSO P-6071 Best Practices manual was developed by the Navy to 
add depth to the all the processes in DoD 4245.7-M.  The format is exceptionally user-
friendly and most of the fundamental guidelines, developed over a decade ago, are still 
applicable today. 
 
 d. Risk Indicators are developed at the program level to measure progress 
toward meeting program objectives, and should be developed by each IPT for the same 
reasons.  Risk indicators may be specification requirements, contract requirements, or 
measurable parameters from any agreement or tasking.  The goal is to establish an early 
benchmark, then monitor progress toward achieving program objectives. 
 
 e. NAVSO P-3686, “Top Eleven Ways to Manage Technical Risk” is a useful 
document focusing on Technical Risk Management.  Technical risk, and the degree to 
which critical technical processes can be controlled, is a significant driver of all other 
program risks.  The conscientious implementation of this guide, in conjunction with the 
aforementioned DoD 4245.7-M and NAVSO P-6071, will ensure an effective Risk 
Management Program. As a bonus, NAVSO P-3686 contains over 35 links to Internet 
sites containing a wealth of scientific and technical information. 
 
 f. PMWS (TRIMS), or Other Software Applications.   PMWS contains risk 
management software, “Technical Risk Identification and Mitigation System (TRIMS).”  
TRIMS is a tailorable management system based on the Template processes. Diskettes, 
which contain the necessary programs for accessing BMP◊NET from IBM-compatible or 
Macintosh computers with a modem, and answers to other questions regarding PMWS, 
can be obtained by calling the Best Manufacturing Program (BMP) Office at (703) 696-




 g. Requirements Documents describe the specific needs of program hardware 
and software.  IPT efforts need to be monitored continuously to ensure requirements are 
met on time and within budget. 
 
 h. Contracting for Risk Management helps ensure that the organizations 
involved with the details of the technical processes of design, test, and production are 
involved with managing risk.  The principle here is that these organizations are normally 
the first to identify known and unknown risk areas.  
 
 i. A Risk database is the primary repository of risks identified as part of the 
program risk management process.  Industry will maintain risk databases for their 
proposed designs. 
 
 j. Robust Design Practices are those which are characterized by a greater 
degree of thoroughness and a higher level of intensity aimed at ensuring that engineering 
disciplines previously underemphasized by the government and underutilized by the 
contractor, have been applied to the design.  A robust design provides a much higher 
level of confidence that functional performance requirements will be met, applied stresses 
are well known, and every part will be able to endure those stresses for the life of the 
product. 
 
 k. Quality Standards, such as ISO9000, ANSI/ASQC Q 9000, MIL-HDBK 9000, 
and others, describe processes for developing and producing quality products.  
Comparing program processes with these standards can highlight areas for change to 
avoid risk. 
 
 l.  Use of an Independent Risk Assessment is a tool to help ensure that 
overlooked risk is identified.  The knowledgeable, experienced people selected are 
independent from the management and execution of the specific program processes and 
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procedures being reviewed.  Prior non-involvement promotes questions and observations 
not otherwise available from within the program management team. 
 
 m. Risk Management Training will be provided by the program to all program 
participants.  Courses will be updated to reflect changes to the risk management process. 
 
 n. DoD 5000 Series Instructions and Notices 
 o. “Methods and Metrics for Product Success Manual” – ASN RDA 
 p. McGraw-Hill Technical Guides 
• “Design to Reduce Technical Risk” 
• “Testing to Verify Design and Manufacturing Readiness” 
• “Moving a Design into Production” 
• “Design’s Impact on Logistics” 
 
 q. “Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition,” January 2000. 
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APPENDIX H — SAMPLE TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
INSTRUCTION 
TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT INSTRUCTION XXXX.X     
  
 
From: Program Manager (PMSXXX) 
 
Subj: PROGRAM TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
 
Ref: (a) Program Instruction XXXX.X - Mission Readiness Reviews 
 
Encl:        (1) Program Assessment Report  
 
 
1. Purpose.  Promulgate the policy, procedures and responsibilities to plan and conduct 
comprehensive, integrated cost, schedule, and performance (mission/technical) 
assessments of system designs, products, and associated development efforts.  
 
2. Applicability and Scope.  This instruction applies to all program personnel who plan 
and execute events or actions that the program manager determines are related to 
program assessments. This instruction provides program management with a 
continuous appraisal of cost, schedule, and performance (mission/technical) 
performance.   
3. Policy.  A formal process shall be used to plan and execute comprehensive, integrated 
cost, schedule, and performance (mission/technical) assessments critical to system 
definition and program execution.  These assessments will be required throughout the 
program life or until superseded by a formal source selection process defined in 
separate correspondence.   
4. Definitions. 
a. Focus Areas.  Principal divisions of program cost, schedule, and performance 
(mission/technical) performance assessment.  The five focus areas are Technical 
Design, System Effectiveness, Life Cycle Engineering and Support (LCE&S), 
Management and Total Cost. 
b. Assessment Areas.  Each focus area is further subdivided into three levels of 
increasingly specific assessment areas, entitled Tiers I, II, and III.  
c. Assessment Criteria.  The standards and measures to which Tier I, II, and III 
assessment areas will be assessed to include Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), 
Measures of Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Suitability (MOSs). 
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d. Functional Area Leader (FAL).  The individual assigned responsibility for 
overall assessment status of a specific aspect of the system design and 
development effort, including industry efforts and government assessments 
thereof.  
e. Assessment Area Leader (AAL).  The individual assigned responsibility for 
conducting assessments in a specific assessment area. 
f. Assessments. Assessments will be performed throughout the program life on the 
occasion of one or more of the following: 
(1) Formal program reviews   
(2) Formal technical reviews (system and subsystem reviews) 
(3) Informal meetings 
(4) Receipt of deliverables which need to be examined 
(5) Receipt of analyses or data which require analysis 
(6) Demonstrations or tests 
(7) Mission Readiness Reviews (MRRs) as appropriate (reference (a)) 
(8) Major changes in industry team approach/concept since the last program 
review, if any 
(9) Emergence of issues that may affect compliance with CDD, statutory and 
regulatory requirements, including environmental issues and impacts 
(10) Emergence of issues that have the potential to affect a decision to commit 
significant program resources 
(11) Identification of items of potential Navy, Department of Defense, 
congressional or news media interest. 
 
5. Objectives.  Objectives of the program assessments are to: 
 
a. Determine whether the system design can be produced and supported within 
program cost goals with acceptable risk.  
 
b. Develop relevant expertise with respect to industry’s concepts and design 
methodology. 
 
c. Assess the performance, value and risks associated with industry’s designs. 
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d. Identify, document and monitor risk mitigation of all moderate-to-high 
performance (mission/technical), cost, schedule and other programmatic risks. 
 
6. Process.  These objectives will be attained by implementing the following approach: 
 
a. Define focus areas and supporting assessment areas for Tiers I, II, and III. 
 
b. Define specific assessment criteria for each focus area and assessment area in 
Tiers I, II, and III.  
 
c. Assess aspects of the system design and development effort, including industry 
efforts and government assessments thereof, using the assessment criteria in 
enclosure (1). 
 
d. Document each assessment to the extent that it can stand alone, or reference 
other sources as necessary.  In this regard, it is important that respective 
assessment area leaders seek and obtain input from other areas as necessary.   
 
e. Produce assessments that support requirements of the program risk management 
process. 
 
f. Produce assessments that support recommendations to program management or 
higher authority. 
 
g. Provide insight for program management to use in allocating assessment 
resources. 
 











Technical Design System Effectiveness  LCE&S           Management      Total Cost 
 
Ship Design  Mission Support  Readiness and     Earned Value          RDT&E  
Logistics Support      Performance 
 
C4I System  Survivability   Training            Program                 Production  
Design                    Management      
                    Performance 
TSC    Mobility   SPM   
 
   Ship’s Crew      IDE            Risk                   Operations 
                   Management          and Support
     
       Modernization           Third Party             Other TOC  
                                                                                    and Disposal             Coordination           Impacts 
 
      T&E            Security 
 




a. The observed performance could be in the form of data, a deliverable, a meeting, 
a demonstration or a formal review.  The assessment should reflect the success 
potential of the design concept/development plan, as well as the credibility of the 
team to execute and achieve the concept/plan. 
  
b. Appendices A through E contain a top-level summary of assessment criteria for 
each area.   
 
c. Each Assessment Area Leader (AAL) will maintain a comprehensive detailed 
description of each assessment area and its associated criteria.  This body of 
information will constitute the definitive basis of information for conducting 
technical assessments in each area.  A duplicate set of this information will also 
be maintained by the AAL in the Master Assessment Notebook in the Project 
Manager’s office.  Assessment Area Leaders are responsible for maintaining their 
respective appendices in this master document in addition to their individual files, 
obtaining Focus Area Leader approval for initial and updated versions throughout 
the program life.   
 
8.  Assessment Reports.  Each assessment will be documented in an assessment report. 
Enclosure (1) is a sample assessment report, which includes a written description for 
each measure of performance, effectiveness or suitability.  
 
a. Assessment reports should be snapshot assessments of each area for which the 
Assessment Area Leader is responsible.  Reports should be concise and require 
only a few minutes for completion in most cases.   
 
b. Each report should include essential information about who is completing the 
assessment and what was assessed. 
 
c. The assessment should characterize performance for the relevant areas observed: 
(1) Summary of superior and deficient aspects of observed performance. 
(2) Discussion of superior or deficient aspects of observed performance that 
merit Program Manager attention. 
9. Risk.  Assessment Area Leaders shall report all HIGH and MODERATE risks 
within their assessment area.   
a. Reports shall include the following: 
(1) Assessment Area Title 
(2) Risk Level (HIGH/MOD) 
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(3) Short Description which includes the appropriate operational 
performance requirements (e.g., KPP) or development process (e.g., best 
practice) not likely to be met 
(4) Rationale (e.g., physical cause) explaining risk and risk assessment; and 
(5) Status of Mitigation plans (e.g., defined, scheduled, approved, funded). 
Include fallbacks if appropriate. 
b. Risk levels (HIGH/MOD) shall be based upon independent (government) risk 
assessments using the following definitions and criteria: 
 
(1) The Risk Factor (RF) = Pf * Cf where Pf is the probability of that shortfall 
occurring and Cf is the consequence of not meeting the appropriate 
operational performance requirement or development best practice  
 
(2) The Risk Factor thresholds set the boundary values for determining the 
Risk Level (RL). The Risk Level is HIGH for RF greater than 0.X. A 
HIGH Risk Level indicates the need for Program Manager attention to 
avoid serious impact to the program.  The Risk Level is MODERATE for 
RF greater than 0.Y and less than or equal to 0.X.  A MODERATE Risk 
Level indicates significant impact to the program is possible without 
special management attention.  
 
(3) The following scoring criteria shall be used to estimate Pf and Cf: 
 
(a) For all risk events that reference operational performance requirements 
use Table 1 for Pf scoring criteria and Table 2 for Cf scoring criteria. 
 
(b) For all risk events that are related to development best practices use 
Table 3 for Pf scoring criteria and Table 4 for Cf scoring criteria.   
 
9. Responsibilities. 
a. Project Manager. 
(1) Designate special assessments to be conducted, when indicated. 
(2) When required, make final determination of assessments conducted by 
program personnel. 
b. Focus Area Leaders. 
(1) Review and endorse assessments conducted by program personnel. 
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(2) Assign additional assessments to be conducted, as required.  
c. System Assessment and Review (SAR) Panel. 
(1) Review completed assessments, as requested. 
(2) Recommend additional assessments to the Focus Area Leaders or Program 
Manager, as appropriate. 
d. Functional Area Leaders.  
(1) Conduct assessments in their specific areas of responsibility in direct 
support of Assessment Area Leaders as delineated in paragraph 7. 
(2)      Formulate formal or informal recommendations to Department Heads 
when indicated by technical assessment results. 
(3)     Coordinate with other Functional Area Leaders as necessary to ensure that 
assessments present a clear and complete characterization of the issues 
being examined.   
e. Assessment Area Leaders. 
(1) Conduct and report assessments, as directed, in accordance with this 
instruction. 
(2) Formulate formal or informal recommendations to Focus Area Leaders 
when indicated by assessment results. 
(3) Coordinate with other Assessment Area Leaders, as necessary, to ensure 
that assessments present a clear and complete characterization of the 
issues being examined.  
11.  Action.  All program personnel shall review, implement, and comply with the 
provisions of this instruction.  Recommendations for change will be submitted to 








A. TECHNICAL DESIGN ASSESSMENT CRITERIA  
1. Ship Design Assessment Criteria 
2. C4I System Design Assessment Criteria 
3. TSC Assessment Criteria 
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B. SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT CRITERIA  
1. Mission Support Assessment Criteria 
2. Survivability Assessment Criteria  
3. Mobility Assessment Criteria 
4. Ship’s Crew Assessment Criteria  
C. LIFE CYCLE ENGINEERING AND SUPPORT ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
1. Readiness and Logistic Support Assessment Criteria 
2. Training Assessment Criteria 
3. Personnel and Manpower Assessment Criteria  
4. SPM / IDE Assessment Criteria  
5. Modernization and Disposal Assessment Criteria 
6. Test & Evaluation Assessment Criteria 
D. MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
1. Earned Value Performance Assessment Criteria 
2. Program Management Performance Assessment Criteria  
3. Risk Management Assessment Criteria 
4. Third Party Coordination Assessment Criteria 
5. Security Assessment Criteria 
E. TOTAL COST ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 
1.  RDT&E Assessment Criteria 
2.  Production Assessment Criteria 
3.  Operations and Support Assessment Criteria 




Table 1 – Scoring Guidance for Probability of Failure (Operational Performance 
Requirements)  
Table 2 – Scoring Guidance for Consequence of Failure (Operational Performance 
Requirements) 
Table 3 – Scoring Guidance for Probability of Failure (Development Best Practices) 






Competition Sensitive (when filled in) 
 
Program Assessment Report  
 
 
Date of Assessment ______________________  
Assessment Leader _____________________  
Organization/Code ______________________  
Phone ______________________ 
Industry POC ___________________________ 
Industry POC Organization _________________ 
Industry POC Phone _______________________ 
Program FAL ______________________ 
 























Competition Sensitive (when filled in)                                      Enclosure (1) 
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APPENDIX I — QUALITY ASSURANCE CHECKLIST 
 
Government Team Assessment Questions Yes No Comments 
1. Risk Assessment  
 
a) Tier Structure - Focus Area and up to nine lower tiers.   
Are the columns complete to at least Tier II? 
Are decompositions complete? 
Are Tier II roll-ups performed? 
 
b) Scenario – The operational context for system employment.  Are Threat 
and Physical Environment specified? 
DRM OPSIT ID provided? 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) specified?  
Are Defended Assets listed? 
Are External Resources listed? 
 
c) Metric –  
Are metrics clear, discrete, measurable attributes that can be used to 
evaluate the tier elements? 
 
d) KPP – 
Is the risk related to a KPP, ORD requirement, or neither? 
 
e) Req/Scen Refs - Reference for required metric value (threshold).   
Is the reference provided?  
 
f) Metric Utility – Utility of the required metric value (threshold), how 
much weight should be put on meeting this threshold.   
Is the rating (H, M, or L) provided and realistic? 
 
 
g) Estimate (Normalized, Lower and Upper Bounds) – Normalized estimate 
on a –1 to 2 scale, with Threshold=0 and Objective=1.   
Is the normalized value provided, and is it realistic?   
 
h) Estimate Uncertainty –  
Is an uncertainty range provided? 
 
i) Pf (and Rationale) – Probability of failure.  Use tables.  Provide 
rationale.   
Is Pf provided? 
Is rationale provided? 
Does the rationale match table guidance? 
 
j) Cf (and Rationale) – Consequence of failure.  Use tables.  Provide 
rationale.  
Is Cf provided? 
Is rationale provided? 
Does the rationale match table guidance? 
 
k) Rf – [Calculated. Risk Factor = Pf x Cf ,  
Low (Green) 0.2 <Med (Yellow)  <0.6 High (Red)    
Is a value provided? 
Do estimate and risk factor agree?  (An estimate above the objective value 
should not be high risk.) 
 




l) Previous Rf – For trend calculation  (If Previous/Present Rfs are the 
same, why isn’t risk being reduced?) 
Is previous Rf  provided? 
 
 
m) Last Update – Date of last update 
 
n) Risk Title – Short title for Risk ID 
 
o) Risk Description – Concise statement for summary reports compiled 
from other column entries. "Expected value for <metric> may not be 
met (Pf=xx), because of <high uncertainty> due to <incomplete testing, 
HW maturity, SW complexity,…>. Consequence (Cf=xx) includes <loss 
of assets, mission degradation,…>." 
 
Is description satisfactory, and can it support decision making? 
 
p) Analysis Source - Primary data source supporting assessment. 
Government study, industry deliverable, best judgment, etc. 
Is the source defined and credible? 
 
2. Risk Mitigation  
a) Summary - General description of mitigation plan.  
Is the plan appropriate for the risk being mitigated? 
Will it mitigate the risk?   
Is there a clearly defined end-condition? 
Is the description complete?   
Is there a clear relationship between the mitigation and risk?   
Is the mitigation plan realistic (cost, schedule, technical)? 
Is it linked to actual Design Test events? 
Are there milestones that have clear metrics for tracking progress?   
 
b) Cost Exposure - Additional Cost adjustments required to mitigate 
risk.   
Is there a cost listed (in $K)? 
Is the cost realistic? 
 
c) Schedule Exposure - Additional Schedule adjustments required to 
mitigate risk.   
Is the schedule adjustment listed (in Months)? 
 
d) Resource Status - Degree to which mitigation task resources have 
been programmed. Ranges from "Proposed" to "Approved" to 
"Funded" to "Funded and Scheduled" 
Is resource status listed? 
 
e) Fallback Options -  
Is there a contingency plan if the Risk is not acted upon, or if the 
mitigation plan is not completely successful? 
Is the contingency plan fully described, including required 
government and industry actions? 
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Are performance, cost, and schedule impacts of the contingency plan 
discussed? 
 
f) Post Mitigation Pf –  
Is Post-mitigation Pf provided? 
Is it consistent with Table guidance? 
Is it realistic, given the mitigation plan? 
 
 
g) Post Mitigation Cf  
Is Post-mitigation Cf provided? 
Is it consistent with Table guidance? 
Is it realistic, given the mitigation plan? 
 
h) Post Mit-Rf - [Calculated. Risk Factor = Pf x Cf ,  
Low (Green) 0.2 <Med (Yellow)  <0.6 High (Red)    
Is a value provided? 
 
i) Completion Date - Completion date of the mitigation effort. 
Is a date provided? 
 
j) Event -  
Is an event identified? 
 
k) Trend -  
Is a trend identified? 
Is the trend correct? 
 
l) Acceptable - Yes or No  
Is the risk reduction effort satisfactory? 
m) Explanation - 
 Is an explanation provided?   
 
n) Recommendation -  
Are recommend Government Actions and/or Fall-Back Options 
identified? 
 
o) Cost Risk (and Rationale) - Quantify in $K additional costs if risk 
remains unmitigated.    
Is the Cost Risk identified? 
Is a rationale provided? 
 
p) Schedule Risk (and Rationale) – Quantify in months schedule 
delays if risk is unmitigated. 
Is the schedule risk identified?   
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APPENDIX J — SAMPLE LOOKUP TABLES 
Operational Performance Requirements Scoring Guidance for Consequence of Failure –  
Effectiveness and Suitability 
 Pf G eneral HW S W HIS S upport In frastructu re C O NO PS
1.0 H igh uncertain ty due to theoretical 
des ign based on advanced 
research. Low technology m aturity. 
R equires  technology breakthrough.
H igh uncertain ty due to 
theoretical S /W  concepts  
beyond known prac tice. 
D evelopm ent of new  approach 
& /or language.
H igh uncertain ty due to low  
m odel f idelity, lack of 
validation. N ew expec tations ; 
breakthrough needed to m ake 
workload and retention 
c red ib le.
H igh uncertain ty due to 
theoretical technology or 
processes  required for support 
s truc ture, S E , train ing, 
fac ilities , support s taf f , or 
P H S & T .
In tegration into F leet/Join t 
tac tics , doc trine N A . N ew 
approach; C u lture changes  
needed.
0 .9 H igh uncertain ty due to new  
theoretical des ign. A pp lication of 
lead ing edge concepts . S ignif icant 
research requ ired.
H igh uncertain ty due to new  
com plex S /W , new approach, 
new   language. new  unproven 
apps . E xtrem ely large scale 
in tegration.
H igh uncertain ty due to  new  
unproven apps . 
H igh uncertain ty due to new  
support s truc ture, support 
equ ipm ent, train ing, fac ilities , 
support s taff , or P H S & T
0.8 H igh uncertain ty due to all new  
com plex des ign w ith m any s tringent 
rqm ts  & /or m ajor in tegration of m any 
new  H W  elem ents . C oncept 
untes ted, not verif ied.
H igh uncertain ty due to all new  
S /W  developm ent; beyond 
experience base. Large 
in tegration of new  or exis ting  
S W . 
H igh uncertain ty due to all 
new; beyond experience base.  
H igh uncertain ty due to 
extens ive changes  to exis ting 
support s truc ture; m os tly new  
S E , train ing, fac ilities , s taff , or 
P H S & T
0.7 U ncertain ty of new  des ign or 
m oderately im proved exis ting des ign 
& /or m ajor in tegration of m any H W  
elem ents . C oncept untes ted; 
pred ic ting M & S  not validated for th is  
use.
U ncertain ty of extens ive 
changes  in S /W  developm ent 
approach &  application. 
M oderate integration of new  or 
exis ting  S W . M & S  not validated 
for in tended use.
U ncertain ty of extens ive 
changes  in  approach &  
application. M oderate 
in tegration of new  or exis ting 
program s. M & S  not validated 
for intended use.
U ncertainty of m oderate 
changes  to exis ting support 
s truc ture; m os tly new S E , 
train ing, fac ilities , s taff , or 
P H S & T
0.6 U ncertain ty of m ajor des ign change; 
s ign if icant m odif ications  & /or 
m oderate integration of H W  
elem ents . Feas ib ilty and M & S  
proven only by analogy, s tud ies  
and/or concept verif ication. S im  
environm ent not acc redited.
U ncertain ty of m ajor 
m odif ication of approach, 
convers ion from  s im ilar S W , 
expanded to new  app lication. 
S om e In tegration needed. M & S  
verif ied by analogy, no d irec t 
validation.
U ncertain ty of m ajor 
m odif ication of approach, 
convers ion from  s im ilar 
m ethods , expanded to new 
application. M & S  verif ied  by 
analogy, no d irec t validation.
U ncertainty of m inor changes  
to 
exis ting support 
s truc ture;m os tly new  S E , 
train ing, fac ilities , s taff , or 
P H S & T
0.5 U ncertain ty of redes ign or m oderate 
m odif ications . In tegration is  prim arily 
of in ternal func tional elem ents . 
S om e feas ib ility s tud ies  and in itial 
tes ting. P red ic ting M & S  verif ied  for 
use.
U ncertain ty of m oderate  
m odif ication &  tailoring of 
exis ting  S W ; c lose link of 
developer to des ign, in tegrator. 
M & S  verif ied  only. 
U ncertain ty of m oderate  
m odif ication &  tailoring of 
exis ting  capability; M & S  
verif ied on ly. W orkload reach; 
retention m arg inal.
U ncertainty of exis ting support 
s truc ture;m os tly new  S E ; 
m inor 
resource shortfalls
S om e coord ination w ith  
F leet/Join t s till needed -- 
synthes is  probable; 
success fu l experim entation 
w ith  lessons  being worked.
H igh P f. F rac tion of es tim ated 
perform ance dis tribu tion that falls  
below  the requ ired (expec ted, 
baseline) value. A pplies  to 
operational m etrics  of effec tiveness  
(techn ical perform ance), and 
suitability (e.g ., O p C os t, R esponse 
T im e, A vailab ility). D is tribu tion 
accounts  for es tim ation uncertain ty 
(e.g ., from  unacc red ited M & S , h igh 
sens itivities  to environm ent, lack of 
tes ting, variance from  B es t 
P rac tices ). S ee further exam ples  of 
uncertainties  in  other colum ns . 
R ange of integration inherent in  the 
d is tribution (e.g ., over O P S IT  sets ) 
shall be desc ribed. A ccounts  for 
redundancy in  des ign for func tion; 
rationale desc ribes  dependency.
M ed P f. F rac tion of es tim ated 
perform ance dis tribu tion that falls  
below  the requ ired (expec ted, 
baseline) value. A pplies  to 
operational m etrics  of effec tiveness  
(techn ical perform ance), and 
suitability (e.g ., O p C os t, R esponse 
T im e, A vailab ility). D is tribu tion 
accounts  for es tim ation uncertain ty 
(e.g ., from  unacc red ited M & S , h igh 
sens itivities  to environm ent, lack of 
tes ting, variance from  B es t 
P rac tices ). S ee further exam ples  of 
uncertainties  in  other colum ns . 
R ange of integration inherent in  the 
d is tribution (e.g ., over O P S IT  sets ) 
shall be desc ribed. A ccounts  for 
redundancy in  des ign for func tion; 




Operational Performance Requirements Scoring Guidance for Consequence of Failure –  




Pf General HW SW HIS Support Infrastructure CONOPS
0.4 Low uncertainty of existing proven 
components; recombined or minor 
mods in function. Predicting M&S 
validated in similar application.
Low uncertainty of slightly 
modified SW &/or combining of 
existing functions with minor 
integration. Developer did 
design, will integrate. Validation 
in legacy similar application.
Low uncertainty of slightly 
modified method &/or 
combining of existing 
functions with minor changes. 
Validation in legacy similar 
application.
Low uncertainty of existing 
support structure; some new 
SE; minor resource shortfalls
0.3 Low uncertainty of existing proven 
components, repackaged and/or 
minor usage variation. Predicting 
M&S validated in sim environment. 
Sim environment validated for use.
Low uncertainty of some 
modification of existing S/W 
approach with minimal 
integration impacts. Developer 
did design/integration. Validated 
in sim environment.
Low uncertainty of some 
modification of existing 
approach with minimal 
changes. M&S validated in sim 
environment.
Low uncertainty of existing 
support structure; some 
modifications to existing 
support
equipment; minor resource 
shortfalls
0.2 High confidence of functional 
proven H/W.  Mods in form only. 
Minor usage variation. Predicting 
M&S validated in op environment. 
Sim environment validated for use.
High confidence of minor 
revision and checkout of existing 
software. No impacts on 
integration tests. Validated in 
most of op environment.
High confidence of minor 
revision and checkout of 
existing  capability. Validated 
in most of op environment.
High confidence of existing 
support structure; minor 
modifications to existing 
support
equipment
0.1 High confidence of functional, fully 
tested hardware and validated M&S. 
Hardware will meet the form, fit, & 
functional rqmts. of the application
High confidence of existing, 
checked out SW. Integrated, 
verified, validated in operational 
environment.
High confidence of existing, 
checked out capability. 
Integrated, verified, validated 
in operational environment 
(capability fully demo'd). 
Workload, retention meet QoL 
objective.
High confidence of all existing 
support elements meet 
program requirements




Low Pf. Fraction of estimated 
performance distribution that falls 
below the required (expected, 
baseline) value. Applies to 
operational metrics of effectiveness 
(technical performance), and 
suitability (e.g., Op Cost, Response 
Time, Availability). Distribution 
accounts for estimation uncertainty 
(e.g., from unaccredited M&S, high 
sensitivities to environment, lack of 
testing, variance from Best 
Practices). See further examples of 
uncertainties in other columns. 
Range of integration inherent in the 
distribution (e.g., over OPSIT sets) 
shall be described. Accounts for 
redundancy in design for function; 
rationale describes dependency.
No failure expected: proven, validated solution in expected operational environment; stable, robust capability.
HSI 
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Development Best Practices Scoring Guidance for Consequence of Failure – 
Effectiveness and Suitability 
 
C f G e n e r a l  M i s s i o n  I m p a c t D e v e l  E f f e c t i v e n e s s D e v e l o p m e n t  C o s t D e v e l o p m e n t  S c h e d u l e
1 . 0 W r o n g  p r o b le m  s o l v e d  - -  u n a d d r e s s e d  
r e q u i r e m e n t s / s c e n a r i o s  t h r e a t e n  p r o g r a m  h o ld  o r  
t e r m in a t i o n .  S i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  p r o d u c t  
u n c e r t a i n t y  ( a n d  O p e r a t i o n a l  P f ) .  I n a b i l i t y  t o  t r a c e ,  
m o n i t o r ,  j u s t i f y ,  p r i o r i t i z e ,  a n d  c o n t r o l  p g m  c a u s e s  
O I P T  f a i l u r e .
P r o g r a m  h o ld  o r  
t e r m in a t i o n  d u e  t o  
s i g n i f i c a n t  f a i l u r e  t o  m e e t  
K P P  t h r e s h o ld .
D e p lo y m e n t  d e l a y  o p e n s  t h r e a t  
w in d o w .
0 . 9 W r o n g  p r o b le m  s o l v e d  - -  e x t r a  c a p a b i l i t y  t h r e a t e n s  
p r o g r a m  v i a b i l i t y  v i a  m i s m a n a g e d  r e s o u r c e s .  O r  
u n e x p e c t e d  c a p a b i l i t y  d e f i c i t  t h r e a t e n s  l o s s  o f  
a s s e t s .
0 . 8 S t o v e p ip e  m a n a g e m e n t  t h r e a t e n s  r e d e s ig n  a t  
i n t e g r a t i o n ,  o r  s i g n i f i c a n t  c a p a b i l i t y  l o s s .  S y s t e m  
d e s ig n  l im i t s  o p e r a t i o n a l  e v a lu a t i o n  - -  i n a d e q u a t e  
i n s i g h t  t o  m e e t  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  t o  u s e r  a n d  o v e r s i g h t .  
O T  o r  L F T & E  f a i l u r e .  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  im p a c t .
0 . 7 S h o r t  v i e w  s o lu t i o n  h i d e s  L C C  o r  s e r io u s l y  l im i t s  
c a p a b i l i t y .
L im i t e d  i n s i g h t  c a u s e s  u n in t e n d e d  r i s k  e x p o s u r e .
R e d u c e d  a b i l i t y  t o  m a in t a i n  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  s y s t e m  
h a v in g  f r e q u e n t  u p g r a d e s .  I n a b i l i t y  t o  p a c e  r a p id  
t h r e a t  a n d  t e c h n o lo g y  c h a n g e .
D a t a  r i g h t s  p r o v i d e  i n a d e u a t e  i n s i g h t  t o  s u p p o r t  
p r o g r a m  m a n a g e m e n t
< 2 0 %  i n c r e a s e  i n  N R E  
c o s t  t o  p r o g r a m .  B u d g e t  
o v e r r u n  s u r p r i s e s  m a y  
le a d  t o  T & E  s h o r t c u t s .
N e e d  t o  r e n e g o t ia t e  M i l e s t o n e  
E v e n t s .  C r i t i c a l  p a t h  v i o la t i o n  
s ig n i f i c a n t l y  d i s r u p t s  
s u b c o n t r a c t o r  t a s k i n g .
0 . 6 T im e l in e s  p r e c l u d e  q u a l i t y  p r o d u c t .  T e a m  p u s h e d  
b e y o n d  b e s t  d e s i g n  p r a c t i c e s .  
0 . 5 L a c k  o f  d i r e c t i o n  /  L e x i c o n  c a u s e s  s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n e f f i c i e n c i e s ,  l o s s  o f  i n n o v a t i o n  o p p o r t u n i t y ;  t e s t  
c o n s o l i d a t i o n s  m i s s e d .   G o v ' t  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  t o  u s e r  
a n d  a b i l i t y  t o  m a n a g e  F S C  w e a k e n e d  b y  l im i t e d  i n -
h o u s e  t e c h n ic a l  c a p a b i l i t y .
0 . 4 I n a d e q u a t e  t o o l s  s l o w  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  r e d u c e  
a t t e n t io n  t o  i n t e g r a t io n  d e p e n d e n c ie s  - -  t im e  f o r  
i n n o v a t i o n  i n a d e q u a t e .
< 1 0 %  i n c r e a s e  i n  N R E  
c o s t  t o  p r o g r a m .
R e a d ju s t m e n t  o f  i n t e r m e d ia t e  
r e v i e w  s c h e d u le s .
0 . 3  S o m e  D e g r a d e d  I n s i g h t / C o n t r o l .  M i s s e d  i n n o v a t i o n  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  I i n e f f i c i e n c y  a n d  e r r o r s  f r o m  m is -
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .
L o s t  L C C  s a v in g s  f r o m  
S P M / M & S  r e u s e
0 . 2 R e t e n t i o n  p r o b e m  d e g r a d e s  p r o g r a m  c o n t i n u i t y < 5 %  i n c r e a s e  i n  N R E  c o s t  
t o  p r o g r a m .
0 . 1 M in o r  d e g r a d a t i o n  o f  i n s i g h t  a n d  c o n t r o l
0 . 0
H ig h  I m p a c t  i f  u n m i t i g a t e d :  H ig h  
P r o g r a m  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  p r o c e s s  
v a r i a n c e  g i v e n  a l l  o t h e r  
p r o c e s s e s  f o l l o w e d .  S c o r e  m a y  
r e f le c t  m a g n i t u d e  o f  s h o r t f a l l  
w i t h i n  t h e  P f  r a n g e .  S o u r c e s  o f  
P r o g r a m  im p a c t  d u e  t o  v a r i o u s  
E f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n d  S u i t a b i l i t y  
w e a k n e s s e s  a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  t h e  
o t h e r  c o l u m n s .
M e d  I m p a c t  i f  u n m i t i g a t e d :  
M e d iu m  P r o g r a m  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  
p r o c e s s  v a r i a n c e  g i v e n  a l l  o t h e r  
p r o c e s s e s  f o l l o w e d .  S c o r e  m a y  
r e f le c t  m a g n i t u d e  o f  s h o r t f a l l  
w i t h i n  t h e  P f  r a n g e .  S o u r c e s  o f  
P r o g r a m  im p a c t  d u e  t o  v a r i o u s  
E f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n d  S u i t a b i l i t y  
w e a k n e s s e s  a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  t h e  
o t h e r  c o l u m n s .
N o  C o n s e q u e n c e  t o  P r o g r a m  o r  M I s s i o n
L o w  I m p a c t  i f  u n m i t i g a t e d :  L o w  
P r o g r a m  s e n s i t i v i t y  t o  p r o c e s s  
v a r i a n c e  g i v e n  a l l  o t h e r  
p r o c e s s e s  f o l l o w e d .  S c o r e  m a y  
r e f le c t  m a g n i t u d e  o f  s h o r t f a l l  
w i t h i n  t h e  P f  r a n g e .  S o u r c e s  o f  
P r o g r a m  im p a c t  d u e  t o  v a r i o u s  
E f f e c t i v e n e s s  a n d  S u i t a b i l i t y  
w e a k n e s s e s  a r e  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  t h e  
o t h e r  c o l u m n s .
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C f G e n e ra l M is s io n  Im p a c t O p  E ffe c t iv e n e s s O p  C o s t O p  R e s p o n s e O p  A v a ila b ility C re w  S iz e In te ro p
1 .0 L os s  o f  A s s e ts ; In ab ility  to  ac t 
d u e to  lik e lih ood  o f  los s ; 
p rog ram  term in ation  d u e to  
K P P , C O I, o r  E xit C r ite r ia  
fa ilu re .
P rog ram  h o ld  o r  
te rm in ation  d u e to  
s ig n if ic an t fa ilu re  to  
m eet K P P  th res h o ld .
S ig n if ic an t c on tr ib u tion  
to  S u s c ep tib ility  d u e to  
s low  reac tion  tim e .
N A P rog ram  h o ld  o r 
te rm in ation  d u e  to  
s ig n if ic an t fa ilu re  to  
m eet p r im ary K P P  
th res h o ld .
N A
0 .9 S ig n if ic an t m is s ion  fa ilu re ; 
In ab ility  to  ac t d u e  to  lik e lih ood  
o f  fa ilu re
0 .8 M is s ion  fa ilu re ; In ab ility to  ac t 
d u e to  lik e lih ood  o f  fa ilu re
0 .7 S ig n if ic an t m is s ion  
d eg rad ation ; L os s  o f  A s s ets  
g iven  w ors t c as e  s in g le  
ad d ition a l fu n c tion  fa ilu re . 
A s s oc ia ted  em p loym en t an d  
p rog ram m atic  im p ac ts .
< 2 5 %  in c reas e in  
O & S  c os t to  p rog ram .
S ig n if ic an t m is s ion  
d eg rad ation  d u e to  
s low  reac tion  tim e
S ig n if ic an t m is s ion  
d eg rad ation  d u e to  low  
ava ilab ility
C on tr ib u tion  to  
in c reas ed  op era tin g  
c os ts  d u e to  m in or  
var ian c e f rom  K P P  
th res h o ld .
S ig n if ic an t m is s ion  
d eg rad ation  d u e to  d a ta  
lim ita tion s  an d  w eak  
d ec on f lic tion  
c oo rd in a tion .
0 .6 M od era te  m is s ion  d eg rad ation .
0 .5 S ig n if ic an t m is s ion  
d eg rad ation  g iven  w ors t c as e 
s in g le  ad d ition a l fu n c tion  
fa ilu re .
L im ited  m is s ion  s e t d u e  
to  in ab ility  fo r  c om b in ed  
op era tion s .
0 .4 S om e m is s ion  d eg rad ation . < 1 0 %  in c reas e in  
O & S  c os t to  p rog ram .
L os s  o f  op  tem p o  d u e 
to  s low  reac tion  tim e.
In c reas ed  in ven tory 
req u irem en ts  an d  
O & S  c os t b u rd en  to  
o f fs e t re liab ility  
s h or tfa ll.
C on tr ib u tion  to  
in c reas ed  op era tin g  
c os ts  d u e to  m in or  
var ian c e f rom  K P P  
th res h o ld , b u t h as  
o f fs e ts  in  o th er  a reas .
0 .3 S ig n if ic an t c ou p lin g  to  o th er 
m etr ic s  typ es ;
M od era te  m is s ion  d eg rad ation  
g iven  w ors t c as e  s in g le  
ad d ition a l fu n c tion  fa ilu re .
S ig n if ic an t w as tag e 
f rom  red u n d an t 
en g ag em en ts .
0 .2 S ig n if ic an t red u c tion  in  
u s ab ility o r e f f ic ien c y. S om e 
m is s ion  d eg rad ation  g iven  
w ors t c as e s in g le  ad d ition a l 
fu n c tion  fa ilu re .
< 5 %  in c reas e in  O & S  
c os t to  p rog ram .
0 .1 M in or  red u c tion  in  u s ab ility  o r  
e f f ic ien c y.
0 .0
H ig h  Im p ac t if  u n m itig a ted : M is s ion  
s en s it iv ity  to  th res h o ld  d evia tion  
g iven  a ll o th e r th res h o ld s  m et. 
S c ore  m ay re f lec t m ag n itu d e o f  
s h o rtfa ll w ith in  th e  P f  ran g e. 
S ou rc es  o f  m is s ion  im p ac t d u e to  
var iou s  E f fec tiven es s  an d  
S u itab ility w eak n es s es  a re  
illu s tra ted  in  th e  o th er  c o lu m n s .
M ed  Im p ac t if  u n m itig a ted : M is s ion  
s en s it iv ity  to  th res h o ld  d evia tion  
g iven  a ll o th e r th res h o ld s  m et, o r  if  
a  s ec on d  w ors t c as e ad d ition a l 
fu n c tion  fa ils . S c o re  m ay re f lec t 
m ag n itu d e  o f  s h o rtfa ll w ith in  th e  P f  
ran g e. S ou rc es  o f  m is s ion  im p ac t 
d u e to  var iou s  E f fec tiven es s  an d  
S u itab ility w eak n es s es  a re  
illu s tra ted  in  th e  o th er  c o lu m n s .
L ow  Im p ac t if  u n m itig a ted : M is s ion  
s en s it iv ity  to  th res h o ld  d evia tion  
g iven  a ll o th e r th res h o ld s  m et, o r  if  
a  s ec on d  w ors t c as e ad d ition a l 
fu n c tion  fa ils . S c o re  m ay re f lec t 
m ag n itu d e  o f  s h o rtfa ll w ith in  th e  P f  
ran g e. S ou rc es  o f  m is s ion  im p ac t 
d u e to  var iou s  E f fec tiven es s  an d  
S u itab ility w eak n es s es  a re  
illu s tra ted  in  th e  o th er  c o lu m n s .
N o C on s eq u en c e to  M is s ion  or  P rog ram
 83
Development Best Practices Scoring Guidance for Probability of Failure Effectiveness and Suitability 
 
 
P f G e n e r a l M a n a g e m e n t R e q u i r e m e n t s D e s i g n P r o d u c t i o n E v a l  ( P e r f / V & V / R i s k )
1 . 0 N o  p r in c ip a ls  id e n t i f ie d ;  l im i t e d  
e x p e r ie n c e  in  r e le v a n t  p r o je c t  
a r e a s ;  p la n s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  
f o r  c r i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  n o t  
a v a i la b le .  T e a m  s k i l l s  a n d  
in t e g r a t io n  n o t  m a t c h e d  t o  
p r o b le m .  R & R  a n d  c o m m o n  
le x ic o n ,  m a n a g e m e n t  t o o ls  d o  
n o t  s u p p o r t  in t e g r a t io n .  D a t a ,  
r i s k ,  c o n f ig u r a t io n s  n o t  
c a p t u r e d  o r  m a n a g e d .
U n k n o w n  R q m t  o r  s im i la r  
R q m t s  n o t  k n o w n  t o  h a v e  
b e e n  im p le m e n t e d  o r  d o c u m e n t e d .
N o  s y s t e m a t ic a l l y  d e v e lo p e d  
s t a t e m e n t  o f  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  a n y  
t y p e  e x is t s .  S p e c s  w i l l  n o t  s u p p o r t  
d e s ig n  o r  s e r v e  a s  e v a lu a t io n  
r e f e r e n c e .
N o  k n o w n  c a p a b i l i t y  o r  
t e c h n o lo g y  t o  p r o d u c e  
p r o d u c t .
0 . 9 N o  p r in c ip a ls  id e n t i f ie d ;  l im i t e d  
e x p e r ie n c e  in   m a jo r  r e le v a n t  
p r o je c t  a r e a s ;  s o m e  p la n s  a n d  
p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  c r i t i c a l  
p r o c e s s e s  n o t  a v a i la b le .
U n in v e s t ig a t e d  R q m t  o r  m a jo r  
e le m e n t s  o f  r q m t  b e y o n d  s c o p e  o f  
p r e v io u s  s y s t e m s .
O n ly  f u n c t io n a l  o r  p e r f o r m a n c e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  d e f in e d .   S p e c s  w i l l  
n o t  s u p p o r t  d e s ig n  o r  s e r v e  a s  
e v a lu a t io n  r e f e r e n c e .
T h e o r e t i c a l  m a n u f a c t u r in g  
c o n c e p t s  r e s e a r c h e d  b u t  
r e q u i r e s  s ig n i f i c a n t  R & D  t o  
d e v e lo p  p r o c e s s e s .
0 . 8 F e w  p r in c ip a ls  id e n t i f ie d ;  
l im i t e d  e x p e r ie n c e  in   m a jo r  
r e le v a n t  p r o je c t  a r e a s ;  s o m e  
p la n s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  
c r i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  n o t  a v a i la b le .
U n d o c u m e n t e d  R q m t  o r  
s ig n i f i c a n t  d e f i c ie n c ie s  in  m e e t in g  
r e q u i r e m e n t s .
F e w   m a jo r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  d e f in e d ;  
c u r r e n t  p r a c t i c e s  a n d  m e t h o d s  
w o u ld  r e s u l t  in  s ig n i f i c a n t  
p e r f o r m a n c e  d e f i c ie n c ie s .   S p e c s  
w i l l  n o t  s u p p o r t  d e s ig n  o r  s e r v e  a s  
e v a lu a t io n  r e f e r e n c e .
C o n c e p t u a l  m a n u f a c t u r in g
p r o c e s s e s  id e n t i f ie d .  
S ig n i f i c a n t  in v e s t m e n t  t o  
d e v e lo p  c a p a b i l i t y .
0 . 7 S o m e  p r in c ip a ls  i d e n t i f ie d ;  
l im i t e d  e x p e r ie n c e  in   m a jo r  
r e le v a n t  p r o je c t  a r e a s ;  p la n s  
a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  c r i t i c a l  
p r o c e s s e s  m u s t  b e  v a l id a t e d .  
R & R  a n d  c o m m o n  le x ic o n ,  
m a n a g e m e n t  t o o ls  p a r t ia l l y  
s u p p o r t in g  d a t a  s h a r in g  f o r  
in t e g r a t io n .  D a t a ,  r i s k ,  
c o n f ig u r a t io n s  p a r t ia l l y   
c a p t u r e d  a n d  u s e d  in  d e c is io n  
m a k in g .
Q u e s t io n a b le  R q m t  o r  m o d e r a t e  
d e f i c ie n c ie s  in  m e e t in g  a l l  
r e q u i r e m e n t s .
M o s t  m a jo r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  d e f in e d ;  
c u r r e n t  p r a c t i c e s  a n d  m e t h o d s  
w o u ld  r e s u l t  in  s ig n i f i c a n t  
p e r f o r m a n c e  d e f i c ie n c ie s .  S p e c  
p r o v id e s  a m b ig u o u s  o r  p a r t ia l  
r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  d e s ig n / e v a l .
N e w  m a n u f a c t u r in g
p r o c e s s  t o  in d u s t r y .  M a jo r  
in v e s t m e n t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
c a p a b i l i t y  &   d e v e lo p  
e x p e r ie n c e .
0 . 6 S o m e  p r in c ip a ls  i d e n t i f ie d ;  
e x p e r ie n c e d  in   m o s t  m a jo r  
r e le v a n t  p r o je c t  a r e a s ;  p la n s  
a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  c r i t i c a l  
p r o c e s s e s  m u s t  b e  v a l id a t e d .
C o n f l i c t in g  o r  u n s u r e  o f  R q m t  o r  
e x p a n d e d  R q m t  f r o m  p r e v io u s ly  
d e v e lo p e d  s y s t e m s .
M a jo r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  d e f in e d ;  
c u r r e n t  p r a c t i c e s  a n d  m e t h o d s  
w o u ld  r e s u l t  in  s ig n i f i c a n t  
p e r f o r m a n c e  d e f i c ie n c ie s .  S p e c  
p r o v id e s  a m b ig u o u s  o r  p a r t ia l  
r e f e r e n c e s  f o r  d e s ig n / e v a l .
P a r t ia l l y  n e w   o r  m o d i f ie d  
m a n u f a c t u r in g
p r o c e s s e s  t o  in d u s t r y  &  n o  
in  h o u s e  e x p e r ie n c e .
0 . 5 M o s t  p r in c ip a ls  id e n t i f ie d ;  
e x p e r ie n c e d  in  m o s t  m a jo r  
r e le v a n t  p r o je c t  a r e a s ;  m o s t   
p la n s  a n d  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  
c r i t i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  v a l id a t e d .
D o c u m e n t e d  &  u n d e r s t o o d  R q m t s  
w i t h  m in o r  d e f i c ie n c ie s .
M a jo r  r e q u i r e m e n t s  d e f in e d ;  
c u r r e n t  p r a c t i c e s  a n d  m e t h o d s  
w o u ld  r e s u l t  in  m in o r  p e r f o r m a n c e  
d e f i c ie n c ie s .  S p e c  p r o v id e s  
a m b ig u o u s  o r  p a r t ia l  r e f e r e n c e s  
f o r  d e s ig n / e v a l .
P r o v e n  M a n u f a c t u r in g
p r o c e s s e s  b u t  n o  in  h o u s e  
e x p e r ie n c e .
I n d ic a t e s  h ig h  d e g r e e  o f  
d e v ia t io n  f r o m  B e s t  
P r a c t i c e s .  U s e  0 - 1  s c a le  t o  
g r a d e  a n s w e r s  t o  B e s t  
P r a c t i c e  q u e s t io n s  in  e a c h  
p r o c e s s  a r e a  ( s e e  o t h e r  
c o lu m n s  f o r  g e n e r a l  
g u id a n c e )  a s  s e e n  a p p l ie d  i n  
y o u r  F u n c t io n a l  A r e a .
I n d ic a t e s  s o m e  d e g r e e  o f  
d e v ia t io n  f r o m  B e s t  
P r a c t i c e s .  U s e  0 - 1  s c a le  t o  
g r a d e  a n s w e r s  t o  B e s t  
P r a c t i c e  q u e s t io n s  in  e a c h  
p r o c e s s  a r e a  ( s e e  o t h e r  
c o lu m n s  f o r  g e n e r a l  
g u id a n c e )  a s  s e e n  a p p l ie d  i n  
y o u r  F u n c t io n a l  A r e a .
D e s ig n  n o t  t r a c e a b le  t o  r e q u i r e m e n t s .  
S e g m e n t  d e s ig n s  n o t  in t e g r a b le .  N o  
t r a d e s  o r  C A I V  c o n s id e r e d .  R o le  o f  M & S  
i l l - d e f in e d .  L i f e  C y c le  i s s u e s  o f  t e c h  
in s e r t io n ,  t e s t a b i l i t y ,  C O T S / O S A ,  
d is p o s a l  n o t  a d d r e s s e d .  D e s ig n  t o o ls  
( in c l  S P M )  n o t  m a t c h e d  t o  s y s t e m  
c o m p le x i t y .  
P r o c e s s  d o e s  n o t  t r a c e  t o  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  r e le v a n t  
s c e n a r io s .  I s  n o t  ju s t i f i e d  o r  
p r io r i t i z e d  b y  r i s k  a s s e s s m e n t s .  
S im  a n d  p h y s ic a l  d a t a  c o l le c t io n  
n o t  in t e g r a t e d  t o  
s u p p o r t / l e v e r a g e  M & S  u s e .  
M & S  V & V  N A .  D o e s  n o t  c o v e r  
l i f e  c y c le  t r e n d  d e t e c t io n .  D o e s  
n o t  p r o v id e  f o r  e r r o r  s o u r c e  
i s o la t io n .  I n a d e q u a t e  a t t e n t io n  t o  
in t e g r a t io n  a n d  t e s t  
c o n s o l id a t io n s .  R e s o u r c e s  n o t  
id e n t i f ie d .  S c h e d u le / r e s o u r c e s  
d o  n o t  a c c o u n t  f o r  t e s t  f a i lu r e s .   
P r o c e s s  d o e s  n o t  f u l l y  c o v e r  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  a n d  r e le v a n t  
s c e n a r io s .  P la n  l in k e d  t o  r i s k  
a s s e s s m e n t s ,  b u t  n o t  d r i v e n  b y  
t h e m .  S im  a n d  p h y s ic a l  d a t a  
c o l le c t io n  a d d r e s s e d  s e p a r a t e ly ;  
M & S  V & V  e f f o r t  u n d e r  s c o p e d .  
L i f e  c y c le  t r e n d  d e t e c t io n  
a d d r e s s e s  o n ly  r e l ia b i l i t y  ( n o t  
p e r f o r m a n c e  o r  t e c h n o lo g y  
in s e r t io n ) .  O n ly  p r o v id e s  f o r  
i s o la t io n  o f  m a jo r  f a u l t s .  
I n t e g r a t io n  s h o r t c u t s ;  l im i t e d  
t e s t  c o n s o l id a t io n s .  R e s o u r c e s  
n o t  f u l l y  id e n t i f ie d  a n d  c o m m i t e d  
t o .  S c h e d u le / r e s o u r c e s  s u c c e s s  
o r ie n t e d .   
D e s ig n  p a r t ia l l y  t r a c e a b le  t o  
r e q u i r e m e n t s .  S e g m e n t  d e s ig n s  
c o o r d in a t e d ,  b u t  n o t  o p t im a l l y  in t e g r a b le .  
A  f e w  m a jo r  t r a d e s  c o n s id e r e d ;  s o m e  
r i s k  l in k a g e ;  C A I V  c o n s t r a in t s  
in c o m p le t e ly  a d d r e s s e d .  M & S  u s e d  
in c o n s is t e n t l y  w i t h o u t  p r o g r a m  le v e l  
g u id a n c e  t o  s u p p o r t / r e p r e s e n t  d e s ig n .  
L i f e  C y c le  i s s u e s  o f  t e c h  in s e r t io n ,  
t e s t a b i l i t y ,  C O T S / O S A ,  d is p o s a l  t r e a t e d  
s u p e r f i c ia l l y .  D e s ig n  t o o ls  ( in c l  S P M )  
p a r t ia l l y  e f f e c t i v e  in  c a p t u r in g  a n d  
c o n t r o l l i n g  d e s ig n .
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Development Best Practices Scoring Guidance for Probability of Failure – Effectiveness and Suitability 
— Continued 
Pf General Management Requirements Design Production Eval (Perf/V&V/Risk)
0.4 Management principals 
identified; experienced in major 
relevant project areas; plans 
and procedures for critical 
processes validated.
Requirement similar to previously 
developed systems but with little 
margin.
Major requirements  defined; 
current practices and methods 
should provide minimum margin 
based on analysis. Spec provides 
minimal support as design/eval 
reference.
Proven Manufacturing
processes but newly 
established capability.
0.3 Management organization 
largely defined and experienced 
in major relevant project areas; 
plans and procedures for 
critical processes validated.
Requirement similar to previously 
developed systems with moderate 
margin.
Major requirements defined; 
current practices and methods 
should provide minimum margin 
based on outcomes of similar 
projects. Spec provides adequate 
support as design/eval reference.
Proven Manufacturing
processes used at least 
twice by design agent.
0.2 Management organization well 
defined and experienced in 
most relevant project areas; 
plans and procedures mostly 
validated.
Requirements well within the 
scope of previously developed 
systems with moderate margin.
Requirements fully defined; 
current practices and methods 
should provide acceptable margin 
based on outcomes of numerous 
similar projects. Spec provides 




occasionally by design 
agent.
0.1 Management organization well 
defined and experienced in all 
relevant project areas; plans 
and procedures fully validated. 
R&R, common lexicon, 
management tools ensure 
optimum integration. Data, risk, 
configurations all captured, 
managed, and used in decision 
support.
Requirements well within the 
scope of previously developed 
systems with significant margin.
Requirements fully defined; 
current practices and methods 
should provide significant margin 
based on outcomes of numerous 
similar projects. Spec provides 
excellent support as design/eval 
reference.
NDI off the shelf 
manufacturing processes 
which have been used 
often.
0.0
Indicates low degree of 
deviation from Best 
Practices. Use 0-1 scale to 
grade answers to Best 
Practice questions in each 
process area (see other 
columns for general 
guidance) as seen applied in 
your Functional Area.
No failure expected: proven process of Best Practices tailored to the acquisition environment; continuous improvement implemented
Design clearly traceable to requirements. 
Segment designs fully integrated with 
perf/CAIV/risk trades. Role of M&S 
optimized for LC payoff. Life Cycle 
issues of tech insertion, testability, 
COTS/OSA, disposal fully addressed. 
Design tools (incl SPM) used to capture 
and manage design complexity.
Process explicitly covers 
requirements and relevant 
scenarios. Test Plans justified 
and prioritized by risk 
assessments. Sim and physical 
data collection fully integrated to 
support/leverage M&S use. 
M&S accredited for T&E use. 
Life cycle engineering data 
collection integral to design and 
support plan. Methods 
effectively isolate errors sources 
for mitigation.Integration testing 
thorough. High level of test and 
cert consolidations. Resources 
fully budgeted and account for 
test failures.  
 85
APPENDIX K — DEVELOPMENT FUNCTIONS – SAMPLE 
QUESTIONS TO ASSESS PROGRESS AGAINST BEST PRACTICES 
 
BEST PRACTICE CRITERIA 
MANAGEMENT: 
Senior Level: 
1. Is there convincing evidence that top-level corporate management is committed to 
program success? 
2. Is the management team comprised of participating representatives from all 
pertinent disciplines (design, manufacturing, logistics, etc.), and are they empowered to act? 
3. Is the management team experienced in systems of identical or similar 
complexity? 
4. Is the Program Manager experienced in planning, controlling, and exercising 
continuous improvement on a contract(s) of similar scope and complexity?  Does the PM 
have experience in controlling cost, schedule, and technical disciplines in an integrated and 
balanced manner? 
5. Is the Program Manager authorized to commit the team’s resources?  What 
additional approvals and what management thresholds must the PM obtain in the team’s 
corporate structure? 
PLANNING: 
1. Is there a Project Management Plan, Project Master Plan, or equivalent?   
2. Does it include critical elements such as organization, lines of communication, 
levels of responsibility and authority, program monitoring and control, communications 
plans for interacting with the Navy (design reviews/major milestones), over-arching 
schedules, etc? 
3. Are planning tools such as PERT and Critical Path networks included in the 
team’s planning regime? 
4. Does the process encourage or allow proactive behavior and reward those who are 
engaged in forecasting problems and taking appropriate mitigation actions? 
MONITORING AND CONTROLLING: 
1. Does the schedule include a comprehensive formal review process to monitor and 
control progress on a regular basis? 
2. Are there procedures and organizational structures in place to facilitate “ad hoc” 
or “in process” reviews? 
3. Does the information technology infrastructure proposed support the control and 
monitoring of the program in an efficient manner?  Does it leverage management tool 
technology without adding risk to the program?  Has the approach been proven on other 
programs of similar data/engineering complexity?  Does the system provide a collaborative 
work and information-sharing environment with all program stakeholders? 
4. Does the team’s management have a plan to accommodate third party 
dependencies if they are required? 
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5. Does the subcontractor management plan (or actual subcontracts) provide 
incentives, collaborative features, and safeguards that ensure excellent performance 
standards? 
 
BEST PRACTICE CRITERIA 
IMPROVEMENT: 
1. Has the team been trained and/or have experience in IPPD, IPT, commercial 
business processes, and outgrowths of Acquisition Reform that can lead to continuous 
improvement, innovative thinking, and lower costs? 
2. Has an independent agent certified the team’s improvement processes?  (This 




1. Is there clear evidence that requirements are understood beginning with the 
mission profile (performance, maintainability, reliability, safety, environmental, etc.)? 
2. Is there a workable traceability tool set and associated business process to track 
requirements to the design products?  Are preliminary design efforts traceable to a 
functional baseline? 
3. Are requirements allocated and verified at the lowest possible level?  Is there 
evidence that the team’s management structure understands the program objectives and 
discrete requirements? 
4. Is there a process and schedule to conduct trade studies on an iterative basis to 
evaluate alternative configurations relative to requirements? 
Design: 
1. Has a clear design policy been defined and communicated to all team members?  
Does it include the latter stages of the ship/system life cycle?  Are systems engineering 
principles, including integration, central to the overall design process? 
2. Is the design team comprised of experienced personnel who can draw upon 
lessons learned in programs of similar complexity? 
3. Does the design process accommodate changes in disciplined fashion?  Can the 
process be partitioned to accommodate technology insertion or higher risk scenarios?  Does 
the Configuration Management Plan support the baseline control as well as a disciplined 
design change process? 
4. Is there a robust menu of design analyses and diagnostic processes including cost 
analysis, criticality analysis, reliability analysis, hazard analysis, etc. to improve and lend 
credibility to design team performance? 
5. Is the design review process well understood and defined so that it can be 
executed collaboratively and effectively with the Navy? 
Production: 
1. Is the production team experienced with identical or similar systems? 
2. Is the production infrastructure in place (including software, hardware, 
integration, and testing)?  Are facilities and capital assets available to accommodate the 
magnitude of the project? 
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3. Have production personnel been involved/integrated in the design process?  Is 
there evidence that the team’s processes will accommodate long lead time items, complex 
integration, and other production challenges? 
4. Is the plan to transition from design to production executable? 
5. Does the quality control/quality management system have sufficient rigor to lower 
the Navy’s risk to appropriate levels?  (ISO 9001, IEEE, SEI standards apply.) 
BEST PRACTICE CRITERIA 
Evaluation: 
1. Has the team developed a comprehensive test program? 
2. Does it take advantage of modeling and simulation and other cost reduction 
testability alternatives? 
3. Does the plan include the appropriate infrastructure (facilities, equipment, etc.) to 
conduct the test program?  Does it cover all certification and safety requirements that the 
government must validate or ultimately approve? 
4. Are there innovations in the test program that are advantageous from a cost and 
schedule perspective over conventional programs? 
5. Is the test program directly traceable to performance requirements/objectives 
including integration and total ship engineering? 
6. To what degree has the team made use of soft analyses to validate performance? 
7. Is the team’s risk management process comprised of appropriate rigor including 
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